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ABSTRACT 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden are research and development intensive nations. 
Investments in R&D have been recognized to affect positively in the cross-section of 
stock returns and IPOs are documented to be significantly underpriced and to realize 
poor market-adjusted returns in long-run. This thesis investigates whether research 
and development expenditure, measured as spending towards R&D scaled with 
revenue, can be used as a forward-looking measure in the aftermarket performance 
of Nordic initial public offerings with a sample of 136 IPOs from 2005 to 2015.  
 
The aftermarket performance of IPOs in the Nordic markets is examined in event-
time utilizing wealth relatives and in calendar-time setting employing time-series 
factor regressions of monthly excess returns for portfolios of IPO companies and 
various risk factors. In event-time, the performance is measured for the initial 
returns, 1, 3, 6, 12 and 36 months and in calendar-time for 6 and 36-month periods.  
 
The results show that the sample IPOs are considerably underpriced and the R&D 
unintensive firms experience significantly higher average abnormal initial returns 
compared to the R&D intensive ones. Adding controversy to previous literature and 
initial assumptions, all IPOs outperform benchmarks in long-run event-time analysis 
and R&D intensive firms prove to perform worse than the R&D unintensive 
companies in nearly all of the measured time periods. Risk-adjusted returns further 
indicate that the issuers are exposed to size risk and the R&D unintensive firms’ 
superior long-run performance is attributable by exposure to investment risk factor. 
IPO literature suggests that the performance measurement is prone to time periods, 
which most likely also explains the loftier returns of IPO firms over the benchmark 
indices in the sample. Moreover, some studies argue that R&D investments cause 
more volatility than investments to physical assets, which could be seen as the poor 
performance of R&D intensive firms due to negative skew in the payoffs from R&D 
investments compared to investments in tangible assets. 
KEYWORDS: IPOs, R&D, short-run performance, long-run performance 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A remarkable milestone in a company’s lifecycle often culminates into an initial 
public offering (IPO), which sets a business as a subject of public trading on a 
supervised and acknowledged market place. After transforming from a closely 
held business into a publicly traded enterprise, company and its aftermarket 
performance develop into a subject of curiosity for a larger group of people 
compared to time before as a private firm. The sharp increase in interest towards 
newly listed equities is largely explained by the desire of individual investors 
and financial institutions to generate returns in capital markets by either buying 
new issues for long-term holding or to realize quick gains via participating in 
equity offerings only to exploit the short-term market inefficiencies, often present 
with IPOs.  
 
Motives for companies pursuing initial public offerings, in addition to purely 
raising capital, pinnacle to numerous reasons ranging from creating liquidity for 
the shares, forming employee retention and rewarding systems to increasing 
awareness of the company in its operating environment. However, the 
aforementioned reasons cannot be assumed to exhaustively dictate companies’ 
desire to go public - although all of them frequently referred to in the listing 
prospectuses as the background and motive behind the decision to go public. 
Ritter and Welch (2002) blame data drought among private companies to 
empirically prove the previously mentioned reasons for going public, excluding 
the obvious capital collection and further improving equity component in firms’ 
capital structure. Instead, Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest market timing and 
companies’ stage in their life cycle being the most prominent factors to determine 
whether or not to assume public status. The market timing as a motive can also 
be seen from the distribution of IPOs in the Nordics from 2003 to 2015 in figure 1 
as clustering of equity issues during “hot” market conditions and times with 
lesser amounts of listing activity due to less attractive state to issue equity. 
 
IPOs have been a prosperous topic for research ever since anomalies shadowing 
the event were found and replicated globally. Still decades after the anomalies 
were discovered, the field remains important as investors exploit price patterns 
found in initial public offerings to generate abnormal returns and companies 
time their equity issuances to suit favorable market conditions to issue shares 
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cheaply. Therefore, initial public offerings have been in the keen interest of 
market participants for a long time and the yearly volume of IPOs continues to 
live in close connection with prevailing economic conditions.  
 
 
 
 
The literature on IPOs includes publications from varying points of view and 
different measures have been used in quest to unravel the puzzle of underpricing 
and poor long-term performance, often associated with initial public offerings. 
Using a novel point of view in the context of Nordic IPOs, this paper aims to 
examine whether research and development expenditure of a company prior to 
an exchange debut correlates with post-IPO performance in the Nasdaq Nordic 
stock exchanges covering IPOs over an 11 year time period from 2005 to 2015. 
The relationship between the R&D expenditure and IPO performance has not yet 
been studied in the Nordic context and therefore this paper provides new 
contribution to the well-documented literature on initial public offerings.  
 
The post-IPO performance falls into two categories – short and long term 
performance. The long-run performance in its simplicity is determined by a 
company’s ability to maximize shareholder wealth, ultimately dictated by the 
market and its view on the fair price of a business in aftermarket. The share price 
adjusts accordingly and either appreciates, depreciates or remains stagnant after 
an exchange inauguration. The performance is measurable by either tracking the 
raw returns for the selected long-run period or using a suitable benchmark to test 
the existence of abnormal returns of a given stock. Using benchmarks is common 
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Figure 1. Distribution of IPOs in the sample countries from 2003 to 2015 (Pörssisäätiö 2018). 
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practice in the IPO research as the newly public firms do not realize negative 
returns intrinsically, but may lose to their respective benchmarks in long-run, 
thus underperforming the general market (Ritter and Welch 2002: 1797).  
 
The long-run performance of newly listed companies is a well-documented field 
and the results promote underperformance for long periods when compared to 
benchmark indices or a set of comparable companies. Ritter (1991) attests 
significant long-run underperformance for IPO companies 36 months after 
assuming public status when compared to comparable corporations matched by 
similar size and industry. Loughran and Ritter (1995) show analogous 
underperformance that persists 60 months after claiming public status in 
comparison to matched non-issuing firms. In general, the long-run returns 
including holding periods from 12 months up to 60 months are deemed to 
provide inferior returns compared to market returns or comparable companies 
in several studies but are also found to be sensitive to methodologies and the time 
periods employed in the papers (see e.g. Levis 1993; Keloharju 1993; Rajan & 
Servaes 1997; Brav, Geczy & Gompers 2000).  
 
In addition to the poor long-run performance of IPOs, the efficient market 
hypothesis defying short-run performance of initial public offerings also receives 
wide attention. In one of the groundbreaking papers on IPO performance studies, 
Ibbotson (1975) popularizes the puzzle of significant underpricing among newly 
listed equities. The field has since provoked a wide range of further studies (see 
e.g. Ritter 1991; Loughran, Ritter & Rydkvist 1994; Loughran & Ritter 1995; 
Loughran & Ritter 2002; Hahl, Äijö & Vähämaa 2014) striving to make sense of 
the “underpricing puzzle” that seems to prevail among IPOs globally even 
decades after the initial discovery.  
 
The short-term performance of IPOs is measured by inspecting the difference in 
the issuing price of a company and the closing price on its first day of trading. 
Often times, the closing price has been substantially higher than the offer price, 
causing the issuing company to lose money and investors receiving a quick gain. 
The anomaly is also known as underpricing and suggests that initial public 
offerings are not either efficiently priced by issuers or investors act irrationally at 
times of equity issues. The efficient market hypothesis confronting glitch is 
exhaustively captured by Loughran et al. (1994) paper covering 25 countries, in 
which all witness significantly underpriced initial public offerings. Underpricing 
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in its essence is important for longer-term returns as well especially at times of 
heavy underpricing, which may lead to eventual mean reversion in stock prices 
(Levis 1993). Underpricing benefits investors who realize free lunches on the 
expense of issuing companies and baffle academics as IPO companies leave 
“money on the table” and do not realize their full potential to raise capital via a 
costly and time-consuming initial public offering (Loughran & Ritter 2002). 
 
Lastly, IPOs are a cyclical phenomenon that correlates positively with the general 
economic atmosphere. During fiscal booms, investors might perceive their option 
of investing in new entrants of the market place overly optimistically, which 
companies placing their stock as a subject of public trading exploit and seek for 
an IPO during economic expansions with generally high prices commanded from 
equities. The reversal occurs at times of market turmoil, where investors observe 
the stock market as an unattractive domain to allocate their wealth and 
companies tend to postpone their IPO plans due to unfavorable market 
conditions. As a result, there appear times of a large number of companies setting 
their shares for public trade and periods with only a few or no entrants as the 
figure already 1 demonstrates for a short period of 13 years in the relatively small 
Nordic market. The phenomenon is closely interwoven with aftermarket 
performance of initial public offerings and the underpricing is in amplified 
position during IPO peaks due to increased asymmetric information problem as 
witnessed with the technology sector in the turn of the millennium (Ibbotson & 
Jaffe 1975; Ritter 1991; Yung, Çolak & Wang 2008). 
 
 
1.1. Purpose of the thesis and motivation 
 
The Nordic countries are research and development intensive nations that invest 
heavily into R&D when scaled with GDP or per capita figures. Investments 
towards innovations and increasing efficiency are driven by public entities and 
private corporations in these countries, which results in the lively overall 
research and development activity. Figure 2 depicts this subject matter in the 
context of OECD and EU28 countries’ R&D intensity on a yearly basis from 2003 
to 2016. Denmark, Finland and Sweden are somewhat homogenous in terms of 
R&D intensity and have been on a systematically higher level on R&D 
expenditures scaled with GDP than other developed countries on average. The 
small size of the Nordics, peripheral location and fairly scarce natural resources 
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have been key agitators in the high allocation of resources towards R&D in order 
to give birth to innovations that drive the economies of these countries and make 
them competitive in a global sphere.  
 
 
 
 
 
Creating new technologies that generate new products or wholly new industries 
often pinnacle from rigorous investments towards research and development, 
which ultimately enrich the innovative entities due to capitalized innovations 
and increased outputs. Hsu (2009) argues in his paper that technological 
innovations increase stock returns and the associated premiums. Moreover, the 
author documents that R&D and patent shocks have significant and positive 
predictive abilities over the S&P 500 index returns and premiums. On an 
international level, the author also finds that patent and R&D shocks affect 
positively to returns and premiums commanded in stock indices of several big 
countries as well. Lin (2012) demonstrates with a dynamic equilibrium model 
that technological progress is driven endogenously by R&D investments and 
raise the expected marginal benefit of physical capital, whilst lowering marginal 
costs of physical investments. Due to otherwise decreasing marginal returns on 
physical investments, the model built in the paper depicts why R&D investment 
intensive companies earn higher average stock returns than physical investment 
intensive firms do.  
 
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Sweden
Finland
Denmark
EU28
OECD
Figure 2. R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP (OECD 2019). 
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The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether the research and development 
expenditures of Nordic companies prior to their exchange debut affects either 
initial underpricing, short or long-term performances. Moreover, it is examined 
whether grouping IPOs in two sets based on their research and development 
expenses can be used as an ex-ante measurement in the future performance of 
new listings to Nordic stock exchanges.    
 
The commonly acknowledged main target of a business in its existence 
culminates in maximizing shareholder wealth via recurring dividends and share 
appreciation by engaging with profitable ventures that create value for investors 
via positive net present value for the series of projects a company decides to take 
upon. R&D activities are drivers of innovations that ultimately fuel companies’ 
success in long-run and prosper societies beyond what maximizing labor and 
other factors of production could yield together. Therefore, companies invariably 
seek for a better future status by investing in research to discover new products 
and seek to develop processes to produce them, increasing productivity and 
profitability with the innovations.  
 
 
1.2. Hypotheses  
 
Even though some previous main studies find IPOs’ underperformance sensitive 
to methodologies and sampling of the data due to periods of irrational investor 
behavior, on aggregate, the literature has recognized underperformance among 
new issues in long-run.  Similarly, underpricing seems to be a global 
phenomenon that prevails among newly listed companies. Both of the anomalies 
captured with significant evidence from Finland by Keloharju (1993) and Hahl et 
al. (2014), underpricing in 25 countries including Nordics by Ritter et al. (1994) 
and both investment periods’ performance more broadly in the Nordics by 
Westerholm (2006).  
 
What ultimately drives the underpricing and poor performance still remains as 
a mystery, although size and book-to-market ratio have explanatory power over 
initial underpricing and following performance of IPO companies (see e.g. Ritter 
1991; Brav et al. 2000; Gompers et al. 2003; Hahl et al. 2014). More recently, R&D 
activity has been documented to affect positively in stock returns (see e.g. Hsu 
2009; Lin 2012). The hypotheses of this study are based on the research and 
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development investments of companies prior to their exchange inauguration and 
subsequent performance in the following manner starting with the null 
hypothesis: 
 
 
H0: Investments to R&D have no effect on IPO performance 
 
 
Assuming that the null hypothesis is proven wrong, two alternative hypotheses 
are formulated following the results of previous literature. Firms with allocation 
of funds to research and development activities are assumed to be future winners 
via new innovations and also victors in the early aftermarket due to investors’ 
expectations on these companies with plausibly high and grand future growth. 
Therefore, the first alternative hypothesis goes as follows: 
 
 
H1: R&D intensive IPOs beat unintensive IPOs and benchmarks in short-run  
 
 
Putting effort and allocating resources in research and development are expected 
to bear fruit in long-run when new innovations are given birth to as the result of 
R&D activity. These new innovations are capitalized via new products or services 
that generate cash inflows and in successful cases increase the market 
capitalization of a company many times over. Deliberate investments in R&D 
activities produce these innovations on a regular basis and previous literature 
(see e.g. Eberhart, Maxwell & Siddique 2004; Guo, Lev & Shi 2006; Songur and 
Heavilin 2017) suggest a positive relationship between investments to R&D, 
increases in investments to R&D and stock market returns. Thus, the second 
alternative hypothesis is formulated in the following manner: 
 
 
H2: R&D intensive IPOs beat unintensive IPOs and benchmarks in long-run  
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1.3. Structure of the thesis  
 
This thesis is structured in the following way from this point onwards. The first 
part discusses previous literature on IPOs and R&D investments relation to stock 
market performance more broadly. The third part introduces the Nordic equity 
markets briefly and the concept of market efficiency that is threatened by the 
anomalies shadowing IPOs. The chapter is followed by some theoretical 
foundations behind IPOs as a process and few of the often employed valuation 
metrics used to arrive with a fair price for an equity issue are introduced. 
 
The part following the features of the Nordic markets and initial public offerings 
presents the methodologies and dataset collected to empirically test the 
formulated hypotheses. After introducing and reviewing the data, the research 
methodologies used to test the sample are discussed. The methodology follows 
seminal research on IPO performance studies and more recent factor models are 
also employed due to the previous literature’s skepticism towards IPO 
performance and sensitivity towards methodologies employed.   
 
The final part of the paper focuses on presenting the results and their 
implications in practice. Results section discusses the obtained empirical 
outcomes and ends this thesis.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 
In this chapter, the earlier literature on initial public offerings and their 
performance are introduced. The literature on the topic is vast and publications 
from various markets globally have been made beginning from the seminal short 
term findings by Ibbotson (1975) and long-term underperformance popularized 
in the literature by Ritter (1991). In addition to general IPO performance studies, 
papers regarding research and development in the context of stock market 
performance are discussed to scope the motivation of this paper in examining the 
relationship of R&D expensing to post-issue performance of IPOs.  
 
 
2.1. Short-run performance of initial public offerings  
 
In the groundbreaking work by Ibbotson (1975), IPOs produced average 
abnormal returns of 11.4 percent when measured as gains from offer price to 
closing price after one month of trading with a sample of U.S. issues occurred 
from 1965 to 1969. As a plausible explanation of the phenomenon, the author 
reasoned that issuing companies underprice their issues deliberately in order to 
avoid poor immediate aftermarket performance for their issues and possible 
lawsuits. Continuing with the Ibbotson (1975) results, Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) 
observed more pronounced underpricing with a larger sample and document an 
average underpricing of 16.8 percent. Moreover, the authors argue that IPO 
markets are cyclical, moving between hot and cold conditions, and claim that 
underpricing is more severe during hot market conditions.  
 
Similar underpricing figures are attained by Ritter (1984). His sample includes 
IPOs from 1960 to 1982 and documents an initial abnormal return of 16.3 percent 
during “cold issue “ market but significantly higher average initial return of 48.4 
percent for a 15 month “hot market” period from 1980 to 1981. The sample was 
later augmented by Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988) paper, which investigates 
IPOs occurred between 1960 and 1987, documenting an average underpricing of 
16.4 percent. Both of the previous papers have examined the “hot issue” markets 
and found further evidence for the Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) hypothesis of a 
positive relationship between having hot markets and more adverse 
underpricing.  
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Well-motivated by the previous seemingly enduring results, Loughran et al. 
(1994) inspect the underpricing phenomenon across 25 countries and 
exhaustively produce evidence in favor of underpricing of IPOs. In all of the 
sample countries, including both developed and developing nations, the new 
issues were underpriced in short-run. Timing motives for companies to issue 
equity is also documented and those firms issuing equity during peak market 
valuations realize the worst long-run returns for investors betting on them.  
 
In Finland, the underpricing was first inspected by Keloharju (1993), who 
discovers average initial excess returns of 8.7 percent for new issues in the 
Finnish equity market. The sample period under investigation from 1984 to 1991 
includes high variation in the initial excess returns ranging from years with closer 
to 20 percent average first-day gains to years with negative average excess 
returns on the first day of trading.  
 
Westerholm (2006) documents IPO performance patterns across the Nordics with 
a sample of 254 new equity issues from 1991 to 2002. The sample countries 
witness a combined average initial return of 17.11 percent but a median return of 
only 5.22 percent due to the inclusion of the technology boom ingested high 
initial returns and the consequent high variation in the sample. Denmark 
witnesses the lowest average underpricing of only 8.5 percent, whilst in Finland 
and Sweden the corresponding figures are 21.89 percent and 15.88 percent, 
respectively. Westerholm (2006) argues that high industry clustering results in 
higher initial returns, contributing to the “hot market” assumption and IPO 
markets’ tendency to rotate between hot and cold conditions.  
 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) record in their paper that the median 
IPO is overvalued at the offer price with about 50 percent in comparison to 
industry peers. Another main finding of their paper dictates that the most 
overvalued IPOs tend to realize higher first day returns than companies with less 
underpriced issues and they have lower profitability, higher accruals and greater 
growth projections granted by analysts, which suggests that IPO performance is 
prone to investors’ biased visions of the future success.  
 
Hahl et al. (2014) inspect the aftermarket performance of Finnish IPOs from 1994 
to 2006 and find significant underpricing with mean first-day gains of 15.6 
percent and median first day returns of 4.1 percent. Moreover, the authors divide 
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their sample in growth and value IPOs by their initial market-to-book ratios at 
the offer price and document slightly higher underpricing for growth stocks than 
value stock IPOs. Similarly to Westerholm (2006), Hahl et al. (2014) sample period 
includes the technology boom and the resulting abundant years in IPOs, which 
shows as large difference in mean and median values of the underpricing and 
the initial returns’ effect on the subsequent longer-term periods.   
 
 
2.1. Long-run performance of initial public offerings  
 
The long-run performance is a vital branch in IPO literature offering several 
points of view explaining the commonly known anomaly as well as varying 
results. The performance in long-run is measured by comparing the IPO shares’ 
price development to benchmark indices or to a set of comparable companies 
over a period of time that may or may not exclude the effect of initial 
underpricing by assuming the measuring period to start from a point where the 
short-term effects are not present.  
 
Despite the early literature on the anomaly reaching well before the nineties (see 
e.g. Ibbotson 1975), an examination by Ritter (1991) is often referred to as the 
seminal work on describing the underperformance of initial public offerings in 
long-run. The paper examines the long-term performance of IPOs with a sample 
of 1526 U.S. equity issues over a ten year time period extending from 1975 to 1984. 
According to Ritter (1991), in the course of 36 months following the issuing day, 
the companies issuing new shares generate cumulative returns that 
underperform significantly the control sample of matching firms during the same 
period. The underperformance is most adversely pronounced among small 
companies and firms issuing in congested years, which the paper refrains to 
explain exhaustively due to short sampling period that could rule out 
interpretations, but deductions on negative relationship between market timing 
and company size to underperformance are implied. However, Ritter (1991) 
indicates suspicion towards the resilience of the underperformance past the 36 
month period by referring to Ibbotson’s (1975) results on a 48 month period 
proposing disappearance of the post-issue underperformance in a longer 
performance examination period.  
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Brav et al. (2000) proceed the study with American IPOs on the course of 18 years 
from 1975 to 1992. The sample is partly the same to that of Ritter (1991) and 
includes 4622 initial public offerings, which are further sorted by book-to-market 
ratios and size measured with total market capitalization. Quintile sets are 
created amounting to 25 different portfolios, which collectively include all IPO 
stocks in the NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ during the sample period. The authors 
find that IPO returns are similar to non-issuing companies’ matched by the book-
to-market ratio and firm size. Moreover, the authors note that over 77 percent of 
the IPOs are classified into the lowest book-to-market quintile and over 50 
percent of the observations fall into the smallest quintile in terms of size. 
Therefore, the underperformance in the sample is attributed to small growth 
stocks similar to Ritter (1991) pondering on small growth companies fairing the 
worst in the long term, whilst being the most underpriced.  
 
Rajan and Servaes (1997) inspect the relationship between IPO stocks covered by 
analysts and the long-run performance of those with a sample of 2725 U.S. initial 
public offerings from 1975 to 1987. They document a positive relationship 
between analyst coverage and initial underpricing, suggesting that 
underperformance is attributable to analysts’ over-optimism towards newly 
public companies and their growth prospects. Moreover, stocks with high 
growth projections forecasted by analysts underperformed the three benchmarks 
used significantly, whilst stocks with the lowest growth assigned by analysts 
overperformed the respective benchmarks. On aggregate, however, after the 48 
month period following the IPOs, the issuing companies returned a raw return 
of 23.8 percent but significantly underperformed the three benchmarks by -17.1, 
-40.6 and -47.1 percent, respectively.   
 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) assume a long time period in measuring the long-run 
performance of newly issued equities by examining 4753 initial public offerings 
on the course of 21 years from 1970 to 1990. They exploit a 48 month period in 
measuring the long-run performance and find evidence that investors received 
an average annual return of 5 percent from IPOs, whilst investing to non-issuing 
companies with similar size for the same period returned a 12 percent average 
annual return. The authors’ give a possible explanation relying on behavioristic 
disciplines suggesting that investors justify high valuations of companies with 
high growth prior to an equity issuance, which ultimately leads to mean 
reversion when growth prospects are not met in reality.  
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In quest of seeking robustness for the previous results on long-run 
underperformance of IPOs, Ritter and Welch (2002) collect a massive sample of 
6249 initial public offerings occurred between 1980 and 2001. They document 
mixed results suggesting that IPO returns are sensitive to a number of attributes.  
The methodologies used (e.g. calendar-time vs. event-time returns) and how the 
sampling period for longer time periods that include times of market turmoil or 
irrational exuberance (i.e. technology bubble for instance) are included in the 
period. Also, similar to Ritter (1991) and Brav et al. (2000), the poor long-run 
performance is driven in their sample by penny stocks that yield high returns on 
their first day but lead to a poor subsequent long-run performance.  
 
Gompers and Lerner (2003) further test the robustness of initial public offerings’ 
long-run performance literature by executing a large out-of-sample study 
covering 3661 American IPOs from 1935 to 1972. The sample period takes place 
before the founding of the NASDAQ and provides evidence for the 
underperformance phenomenon before the returns of IPOs were not 
systematically analyzed. The results show underperformance 60 months after the 
IPOs if event-time buy-and-hold abnormal returns are used, although 
statistically insignificant. The underperformance disappears when cumulative 
abnormal returns are used. In addition, similarly to Brav et al. (2000), a calendar-
time analysis displays that IPOs return as much as the market in terms of returns 
over the same sampling period, contradicting the previous results and bringing 
up the importance of using various methodologies in IPO studies.  
 
Previously discussed studies have exclusively focused on American exchanges 
and reported long-run underperformance of IPO firms, although to some extent 
sensitive to time periods and methodologies. Levis (1993) conducts a study 
covering 712 initial public offerings in the London Stock Exchange from 1980 to 
1988 and discovers poor performance for new equities over a 36 month period 
after an issue. The underperformance varies between 8.3 and 23 percent, 
depending on the benchmark used. Controversially to previous assumptions (see 
e.g. Ritter 1991; Ibbotson 1975), Levis (1993) suggests that the underperformance 
in the long-run would exceed beyond the 36 month period employed.  
 
The U.K. initial public offerings’ performance is revisited by Espenlaub, Greogry 
and Tonks (2000), who seek to further examine the robustness of previous results 
obtained by Levis (1993) with a new sample of 588 IPOs by non-financial 
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companies. The authors find evidence for the methodologies concern in IPO 
literature as the underperformance over 60 months after an issue depends 
significantly on the methodologies and benchmarks used. Event-time methods 
provide negative abnormal performance 36 months after an issue regardless of 
the benchmark, whilst after 60 months abnormal returns are less negative and 
the negative sign even becomes dependent on the benchmark applied. Calendar-
time regressions on underperformance further suggest that IPOs perform at par 
with the market similar to findings by Brav et al. (2000) and Gompers and Lerner 
(2003).  
 
The robustness of underperformance literature conducted in larger financial 
markets is examined by further investigations on smaller ones. Keloharju (1993) 
studies the phenomenon in the Helsinki Stock Exchange and collects results 
indicating significant underpricing by 8.7 percent and substantial negative 
underperformance of -21 percent for IPO companies compared to the stock 
exchange’s value-weighted index in long-run.  Westerholm (2006) further 
extends the long-run performance to cover the Nordic IPO markets over a period 
from 1991 to 2002. His sample of 254 new equity listings on the main official 
exchanges in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden provide mixed results. 
Initial public offerings in Norway and Denmark outperform the market index 
significantly, whilst IPOs in Finland and Sweden underperform their respective 
market indices over long-run in event-time analysis.  
 
The relationship between having venture capital backing prior to issuing equity 
and long-run performance is studied by Brav and Gompers (1997) with issues 
from 1972 to 1992. The authors find that venture-backed IPOs beat non-backed 
initial public offerings with equally weighted returns, whilst value weighting 
diminishes differences in performance to insignificant terms and reduces the 
underperformance of IPOs with no venture-backing. However, using the Fama-
French three-factor model shows no significant underperformance for venture-
backed companies, whereas the smallest non-backed issuing companies do 
underperform. The authors also document that the underperformance is not 
unique for the IPOs per se as non-issuing companies of similar size and book-to-
market ratios also underperform during the same sample period.  
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2.2. Hypotheses for IPO performance 
 
Although there is no fundamental theory explaining the underpricing and 
underperformance of IPOs exhaustively, previous literature has come up with 
various ideas seeking to explain both phenomena. Underpricing is often 
emphasized by information asymmetries and poor long-run performance with 
the size of the issuers, methodological issues and time periods as well as with 
behavioral schools of thought. Several informational and behavioral points of 
view have been developed to explain the phenomenon and the most prominent 
ones are discussed further in this subchapter.  
 
The role of investment banks’ importance in underpricing of new issues is 
examined by Beatty and Ritter (1986). The authors test two propositions, 
expecting a monotonic relationship between investors’ ex-ante uncertainty and 
underpricing as well as assuming that investment banks have an incentive to 
create a desirable underpricing for an issue. If an IPO is underpriced to the 
extreme, issuing company is not satisfied, deteriorating investment bank’s 
reputation among plausible future issuers. Also, investors lose interest in IPOs of 
an investment bank that systematically provides low levels of underpricing, 
leading investment banks to a price optimization puzzle for new issues.  
 
Rock (1986) suggests a “winner’s curse” model in which some investors hold 
superior information from issues at hand and know when to bet on a certain new 
issuer and withdraw from the market when low-quality IPOs are being offered. 
The well-informed investors overcrowd less-informed counterparties at times of 
good issues, when offer price is lower than the observable fair value, and leave 
the expensive and less-desirable IPOs at hands of the less-informed investors. 
The company offering the shares must take this into account in the pricing and 
deliberately discount the issue to let the uninformed investors claim their part of 
the issues as well.  
 
Seeking to explain reasons for short-term underpricing and subsequent long-
term underperformance from a behavioral point of view, Miller (1977) proclaims 
the divergence of opinions hypothesis. According to the theory, investor sentiment is 
divided between over-optimism and pessimism on the verge of initial public 
offerings and early aftermarket. The number of investors with positive outlook 
overrun their downbeat peers due to short selling constraints that exist in the 
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early aftermarket, thus solely creating the demand towards the asset and pricing 
it, consequently driving its price beyond the intrinsic value. Eventually, prices 
decline after investors’ opinions harmonize and over-optimism diminishes with 
new information flowing to the market. Therefore, the underpricing becomes the 
product of short-term optimistic valuation, which in turn contributes to poor 
long-run performance.  
 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) provide evidence for the theory of 
diverging investors’ opinions in their study claiming that investors with an 
overly positive outlook on an IPO company overrun investors with more modest 
expectations, contributing to high early aftermarket prices and poor subsequent 
performance. Investors do not act rationally, which makes the underpricing 
possible, assuming that the offerings are efficiently priced following company 
fundamentals. The Miller (1977) paper is the base for behavioral theories 
explaining the performance of IPOs in short and long-run, therefore also acts as 
a source of inspiration for the Impresario hypothesis coined later. 
 
The impresario hypothesis by Shiller (1990) states that IPOs fall as victims to fads, 
where short-term share appreciation may be a product of excessive demand 
created by underwriters’ intentional undervaluation, which ensues to investors’ 
collective interest towards a “hot” issue. The fake news creates interest towards 
the share and generates high short-term aftermarket returns, which will affect the 
long-term returns as optimism-laden share prices tend to convert towards 
intrinsic values in long-run, contributing to the underperformance. Ritter (1991) 
provides evidence for the hypothesis and stresses how young companies with 
high market-to-book ratios (i.e. young growth companies) at times are targets of 
mania among investors due to surreal growth prospects, which ultimately might 
lead to poor long-run performance for these kind of companies especially – 
adversely witnessed during and after the burst of the dot-com bubble at the turn 
of the millennium. Similar low book-to-market and small size effect driving poor 
long-run performance are documented in the literature (see e.g. Brav et al. 2000; 
Gompers et al. 2003; Hahl et al. 2014) as discussed previously.  
 
In a third explanation seeking to demystify the underperformance relying on 
behavioristic disciplines, Ritter (1991) introduces the windows of opportunity 
hypothesis in which companies exploit favorable market conditions to issue new 
equity during times of low book-to-market and earnings-per-share ratios. The 
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encouraging conditions culminate to the market being in a “hot” state, where 
valuations are high and investors share bullish views on new entrants, creating 
the “windows of opportunity” for issuers. The hypothesis is closely linked with 
the fads hypothesis by Shiller (1990) as the over-optimism among investors 
culminate into the opportunities, which in turn contribute to underperformance 
due to prices’ tendency for mean reversion after periods of irrational investor 
behavior.  
 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) later provide evidence for the hypothesis stating that 
companies gone public in high volume periods underperform in long-run, 
further reinforcing the concept that poor long-run underperformance is related 
to and perhaps compiled from initial underpricing. Schultz (2003) contributes by 
stating that when interpreting ex-post, during times of high IPO activity with 
higher prices commanded in the market, companies with poor quality in terms 
of profits and unreliable future prospects tend to exploit. The optimism among 
new investors ultimately leads to poor long-term performance due to mean 
reversion after high initial aftermarket prices. Opposing evidence against the 
windows of opportunity hypothesis unsurprisingly is found from Japan by 
Kang, Kim and Stulz (1999), who discover no evidence supporting the theory as 
issuers with high market-to-book ratios witness no poorer subsequent long-run 
performance than their peers with lower figures.  
 
 
2.3. R&D and stock returns 
 
Chan, Lakoshnik and Sougiannis (2001) investigate the relationship of 
investments towards research and development and stock market pricing over a 
sample period from 1975 to 1995. The authors find companies investing in R&D 
faring no better than firms with no investments towards research and 
development with very similar 19.65 and 19.50 percent annual returns for both 
groups. Subsequently, the authors argue that markets incorporate all the benefits 
of R&D expenditure and the R&D intensive companies do not, therefore, witness 
abnormal returns, although their returns are observed to be more volatile. 
Despite overruling the over performance of R&D expensing portfolio in their 
sample, the authors document a positive relationship between research and 
development intensity and positive abnormal returns.  
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Using a longer sample period than Chan et al. (2001), Eberhart et al. (2004) 
examine the relationship between unexpected investments to research and 
development and subsequent stock performance in the US with a sample from 
1951 to 2001. They document consistent evidence for positive abnormal returns 
for five years following sudden increases to R&D. More importantly, the authors’ 
findings suggest that the benefiting nature of investments towards R&D is not 
immediately or fully absorbed by the market and therefore are mispriced. 
  
Motivated by previous studies, Chambers, Jennings and Thompson (2002) 
examine the earlier documented positive relationship between R&D investments 
and cross-section of stock returns and challenge the prevailing explanation of 
mispricing of R&D intensive firms’ abnormal returns. The authors investigate 
89 419 firm-year observations from 1979 to 1998 and argue that conventional 
methods for controlling risk do not capture the riskiness of R&D intensive 
companies correctly, which causes the measured excess returns to be positively 
biased. Positive abnormal returns persist up to ten years in event-time analysis, 
whereas calendar-time setting produces lots of variation, supporting their claim 
that the riskiness of R&D intensive companies drives the positive abnormal 
performance. 
 
Kothari, Laguerre and Leone (2002) observe in their study how investments 
towards research and development cause more variability in future earnings 
when compared with investments to tangible assets. The result suggests that the 
payoff from investing to R&D activities does not necessarily always realize as 
future success. Also, there is high variation in the level of realized returns, which 
contributes to Chambers et al. (2002) argument on R&D intensive stocks having 
higher risk levels driving the abnormal returns.  
  
In the first attempt seeking to demystify IPO performance with R&D, Guo et al. 
(2006) inspect the effect of R&D on initial underpricing and long-term 
performance of IPOs in the U.S. over a sample period from 1980 to 1995. The 
authors find significant evidence for R&D activity and short-term underpricing 
and long-run performance. Guo et al. (2006) find that research and development 
activities are positively related to both initial underpricing and long-term 
performance of new equity issues. They argue that in the modern world, 
companies are in a continuous need to engage with growth-inducing activities 
and R&D is a path for future growth valued by investors.   
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Ehie and Olibe (2010) investigate investment allocation to research and 
development and stock market value of companies over an 18 year period by 
dividing their sample between service and manufacturing industries. The sample 
period also includes the 9/11 attacks in order to examine whether a major market 
turmoil and black swan type of events could affect the robustness of previous 
results. The authors find out that investments towards R&D affect positively in 
the market value of the sample companies in accordance with the previous 
literature, despite having a major negatively affecting period in their sample. 
Interestingly, in their subsample period prior the 9/11 attacks, the R&D 
investments in manufacturing sector contributed more positively than in the 
service sector, whilst the opposite holds true for the period after the 9/11 attacks.  
 
Contributing to Chambers et al. (2002) initial assumptions on R&D intense 
companies’ riskiness, Li (2011) investigates financial constraints, R&D and stock 
returns. The author argues that investments to intangible assets, such as R&D, 
are more inflexible than investments to capital goods, which adds financial 
constraints to R&D intensive firms. R&D intense companies’ risk increases 
alongside with the level of financial constraints and finically constrained firms’ 
risk increases alongside R&D intensity, showing a relationship between being 
financially constrained and having uncertain future payoffs for R&D intense 
firms. Overall the results suggest that R&D intense companies’ returns are driven 
by the increased risk due to financial constraints.  
 
Songur and Heavilin (2017) examine stock returns and abnormal changes in R&D 
expenditures over a period from 1975 to 2015 and find a positive relationship 
between increases towards research and development and subsequent stock 
market performance. The phenomenon is in pronounced position for smaller 
companies that have been past winners. The companies with positive changes in 
R&D expenditure beat the market benchmarks and firms with negative changes 
in research and development expenditure with abnormal returns ranging from 
3.2 to 11.5 percent. The results are robust and not driven by size, technological 
endowments nor asset growth effect. Also, the authors argue that due to the less 
ambiguous nature of R&D investments, stock prices do not fully reflect 
information signaled by the R&D increases similar to Eberhart et al. (2004). 
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3. MARKET EFFICIENCY AND THE NORDIC EQUITY 
MARKETS 
 
 
Initial public offerings are events that allow the capital allocation to happen in a 
somewhat efficient way by connecting the resource-laden investors with 
companies looking to raise additional funds. In spite of IPOs role as a forum for 
capital distribution, previously seen short and long-term anomalies coincide with 
initial public offerings, which deteriorate market efficiency in the presence of 
price inefficiencies that should not appear in fully efficient capital markets. 
However, Lowry and Schwert (2004) note that even though IPOs suffer from 
market inefficiencies related to pricing as underwriters might not include all 
available information to the initial pricing band, the economic impact remains 
small. Contradicting to Lowry and Schwert (2004) findings on IPOs being fairly 
efficient events, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) note that the most 
overvalued IPOs gain the most during the first day of trading, whereas in 
efficient markets the most undervalued issues should gain the most as the 
markets would determine the price according to the underlying fundamentals, 
not by fads and investor herding per se that drive the price in reality often times.   
 
 
3.1. Efficient markets  
 
Capital markets exist for the purpose of sourcing wealth from entities with excess 
funds to those in need of capital beyond their own reach. In an efficient market, 
capital flows with ease and prices incorporate fully all available information i.e. 
there are no opportunities for investors to use specific set of skills to realize 
positive abnormal returns by exploiting market inefficiencies and price patterns. 
Assuming efficient markets acts as a cornerstone for modern financial theory and 
virtually every asset pricing model holds an assumption of efficient markets in 
order for them to provide reliable results.  
  
The debate of having efficient markets or not has been an essential part in finance 
literature for decades with proponents in favor and opponents suggesting more 
behavioristic explanations. Despite the roots of market efficiency theories most 
likely reaching centuries back, groundwork on the topic by Bachelier (1900) 
discusses the modern features of market efficiency. Bachelier (1900) studies the 
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capital market price movements and discovers that prices reflect both past and 
present information in addition to future expectations discounted to the present 
moment. More importantly, Bachelier (1900) reasons mathematically that the 
expected value of price development of stocks is zero and the process is random, 
suggesting that the probability for a price to go either up or down in consecutive 
trading days is comparable to a coin toss. The findings later developed into the 
random walk hypothesis that attests stocks’ prices moving up or down in an 
arbitrary manner. Moreover, according to the random walk theory, it is not 
possible to forecast future prices infinitely as price movement is a series of 
mutually independent occurrences i.e. similar to tossing a coin.  
 
The seminal work of Bachelier (1900) remained in the dark for decades before the 
modern time efficient market acolytes took over the rostrum with further 
implications to factors describing market efficiency. Moreover, Fama (1970) coins 
the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) in which market efficiency is divided into 
three forms. In the weak-form efficiency, prices reflect fully all the information 
garnered in the past prices. Therefore, future stock prices cannot be forecasted by 
using past pricing data and technical analysis is not applicable for making 
abnormal profits on a regular basis. Semi-strong efficiency attests that prices fully 
reflect all available information and adjusts to new market news instantly and 
accordingly. Anomalies may occur, but they are quickly swept away by well-
informed investors. In the greatest form of market efficiency, the strong-form 
efficiency, markets fully reflect all public information and insider information held 
by small groups of company insiders. According to the strongest form of market 
efficiency, investors should not be able to generate positive abnormal returns, 
regardless of the amount of research conducted or additional information 
obtained. Therefore, beating the market does not rely on deliberate actions or a 
specific set of skills, but merely on pure luck or assuming more risk by investing 
in riskier assets. Exploiting insider information also has its hindrances as there 
are national financial supervisors for the reason that insiders would not abuse 
their position in companies at the expense of less informed market participants. 
 
It can be reasonably argued that markets are not efficient in the strongest form at 
all times as there exists a great number of investment professionals and private 
entities seeking to exploit own expertise and superb information in order to beat 
the market by abusing anomalies and observable patterns in asset prices. Free 
lunches in forms of numerous documented anomalies exist in the markets and 
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they prevail even decades after their initial documentation, but arbitrage 
opportunities are quickly swept away, suggesting that markets operate 
efficiently but hold inefficiencies regarding asset prices. 
 
 
3.2. Nordic equity markets  
 
The Nordics have fairly new but developed markets for issuing and trading 
equities and consists of five countries in total: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden. However, in this study the focus is appointed to IPOs in 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden as their stock exchanges are under the NASDAQ 
group, whereas the Norwegian Oslo Børsen is not and the NASDAQ Iceland is 
very small and consists largely of financial firms. 
 
The included stock exchanges have developed rapidly over the past few decades 
alongside with the economies of the respective countries. The stock exchanges 
have developed during the past three decades from relatively small domains into 
more actively followed forums of trading and fund collection. Small stock 
exchanges, such as the Nordic ones, are thought to operate more inefficiently 
than their major peers due to information asymmetries, less developed 
investment analysis because of fewer analysts covering the markets and less 
restrictive trading rules (Kallunki, Martikainen, Martikainen & Yli-Olli 1997: 
475). The small exchanges also suffer from the thinness of liquidity, which might 
repel large institutional players as they are not able to buy and sell large blocks 
of shares without constraints, although IPOs offer to do so as cornerstone 
investors. The Nordic countries are among the most stable nations in the world 
in terms of having unwavering and predictable political and institutional 
environments, which are important factors to ponder when conducting global 
asset allocations and therefore these markets are followed globally due to asset 
diversification benefits.  
 
The recession in the early 1990s took its toll in the Nordic economies, but the 
countries and their stock markets rose from the adverse shock eventually in 
congestion with the rapid growth of the economies of these countries. In addition 
to the sheer economic expansion, deregulation of capital markets and 
technological advances in electric trading took place gradually during the 1990s, 
contributing to the rise in stock market capitalizations (Vaihekoski 1997: 533).  
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The Finnish and Swedish equity markets witnessed irrational exuberance 
alongside with the rest of the developed world in the turn of the millennium. In 
1999 stock market capitalizations peaked as the result of rapid growth a few years 
preceding. In hindsight, the rapid share appreciation and public’s great interest 
towards new technology stocks was given the name “dot-com bubble”, which 
eventually burst and the stock market capitalizations melted in both countries. 
The less volatile Danish stock exchange was not nearly as adversely hit by the 
event due to the smaller amount of new technology stocks that were more 
abundant in the Finnish and Swedish stock exchanges during that time. Since the 
technology boom and the subsequent crash, the Danish market has caught up 
with its neighbors. Another hit was taken during the global financial crisis in 
years 2007 to 2008 as each market place lost over 50 percent of their market 
capitalizations in a single year as the result of asset bubble bursting and reduced 
global output. Overall, the Nordic equity markets have evolved from a small and 
isolated market place at the beginning of nineties into a more integrated part of 
the global economy and the market capitalizations have grown consequently. 
The development of the equity markets in terms of market capitalization in 
billions of Euros over the most recent three decades is illustrated in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Stock market capitalizations in billions of Euros from 1989 to 2016 (Datastream 2018). 
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4. FEATURES OF IPOS AND THE PROCESS  
 
 
In order to get a better grip on why companies decide to pursue a public status 
via initial public offerings, it is important to discuss further features of the 
issuance processes, requirements and also the stages that companies need to 
engage with to see an IPO ensue from an intention to a successful execution. The 
following chapter discusses the aforementioned topics and presents some 
common valuation metrics used to determine the issue price that investors are 
interested in when seeing new companies seeking for a market admission.   
 
 
4.1. Why do companies take part in IPOs?   
 
Apart from raising capital, what really drives companies to pursue an IPO 
depends naturally on a variety of things. Regardless of firm-specific reasons 
behind the intentions to chase an IPO, each company is expected to fulfill certain 
requirements and go through a regulated process before seeing its equity traded 
in a public market place. The process is time-consuming and costly to say at least 
and therefore screens out the smallest firms due to resource constraints. Smaller 
companies also have a difficult time in raising the interest of investors, who 
might not have ever heard of some small company thriving for an IPO. Selling a 
part of a company via an IPO also takes away ownership and voting rights from 
the initial owners even if they decide to remain as major shareholders after the 
issuance, which might adversely steer the interest of especially family-owned 
businesses to go public. In the light of the prior aspects, it can be reasoned that 
there appear hindrances in the process that limit the interest of companies and 
most often the firms going public have surpassed a certain stage in their life cycle.  
 
Literature studying the incentives behind IPOs is scarce due to the overall lack of 
data among private firms to provide generalizing results for motivation to go 
public. A seminal theory by Zingales (1995) suggests that companies seek 
exchange listing to make M&A activity easier by having a publicly traded share 
for future acquisitions and added visibility via the public status. Pagano, Panetta 
and Zingales (1998) revisit the question by inspecting a large set of private 
companies in Italy that could have gone public based on their accounting data if 
compared to similar public companies and their figures. The authors’ capture 
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similar market timing motive as Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995), 
suggesting that market conditions with high valuations (high M/B ratios) 
motivate firms for two main reasons: Companies are attracted to the thought of 
issuing equity during peak valuation in order to sell shares at low cost and the 
high market valuation also signals good growth prospects in a given industry, 
which motivates companies to engage in the public equity market of a such 
prosperous domain. Pagano et al. (1998) further state that companies do not seek 
the equity financing to pursue future investments per se, they rather use the 
proceeds to lower leverage after a period of investments and allow owners to 
liquidate their positions during the process. In the sample, the issuance process 
is observed to follow aggressive growth and the consequential increase in 
leverage that can be eased with the proceeds from selling equity via an IPO.  
 
Inspired by Pagano et al. (1998) paper, Kim and Weisbach (2005) collect a massive 
cross-sectional sample of 16 958 IPOs with which they unsurprisingly reason that 
capital collection is an important intention for an initial public offering. In their 
sample, 79 percent of all funds raised come through the sale of primary shares, 
which is correlated with companies’ plea for capital, whilst selling secondary 
shares does not signal the demand for incremental funds and suggests greater 
motivation towards market timing. Ritter and Welch (2002) also comment that 
favorable market condition is the most important factor in determining 
companies’ willingness to seek for an IPO, in the expectation that companies are 
past a certain stage in their spans of life.  
 
The motivation for IPOs is further explored by Kim and Weisbach (2008) who 
estimate the actual uses of proceeds from initial public offerings and find out that 
equity offers are commenced to raise capital for future investments. More 
specifically, funds are explicitly collected for R&D activities and evidence of 
market timing is also found from the sample as high market-to-book firms tend 
to keep a substantial amount of the offer proceeds as cash, whereas low market-
to-book companies put the proceeds to work in terms of investments.  
 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) take a different point of view in the companies’ 
willingness to apply for public trading by surveying 336 CFOs in the United 
States for their companies’ primary motivation for an IPO. The authors find that 
creating publicly traded shares for future acquisitions is the most important 
factor with market timing, whereas lowering cost of capital does not play a 
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significant role in their consideration nor do they seek to repay debt with IPO 
proceeds as documented by Pagano et al. (1998). In comparison to American 
CFOs’ motives for an IPO, Bancel and Mittoo (2009) document the most 
important incentives for European CFOs being in increasing awareness of the 
company and raising funds for future investments. Even though the motives vary 
significantly across countries, companies and legal systems in Europe, Bancel 
and Mittoo (2009) find a significant difference between European and American 
CFOs’ motives. European chief financial officers consider external monitoring by 
financial authorities and analysts as a major benefit, whilst their US colleagues 
experience increased external monitoring as a major cost induced with the IPO.  
 
 
4.2. IPO process  
 
When the decision to assume public status is made, the first step in the route from 
private to public is to look for underwriters that will take the procedure from start 
to finish. Depending on the size of the issue and risk allocation, the chosen 
underwriter may act alone or can form a syndicate of underwriters that work 
together. Often times, the underwriters chosen, have an important role 
throughout the process as they give initial financial advice and most importantly 
are involved in the issuance procedure as enablers via buying the shares of an 
issuing company and reselling them in the aftermarket. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 
2014: 377).  
 
The previously described method to arrange an IPO is known as firm commitment, 
where underwriters buy shares to be sold from the issuing company to sell them 
forward to the public via the IPO. The underwriters bear the risk of the process 
by acquiring shares from an issuing company and need to be confident with 
selling the acquired shares to the public in order to exit from their position and 
not be left with shares of a company with poor demand. With the added risk, 
however, the procedure profits the underwriters the more shares they can sell to 
the public from the spread between acquiring and selling the shares. In more 
risky IPOs with uncertain demand, underwriters may engage with the best efforts 
method, where they seek to sell as much of the issue as they can without being 
responsible for selling the issue in full. In best efforts method, risks are more 
limited but as a tradeoff, the profits are fixed. As a third method all-or-none deal 
may be used, which gives an issuer a right to cancel the issuance process if the 
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Table 1. IPO process (Pörssisäätiö 2016). 
offered shares are not bought in full by the public, leaving underwriters with no 
compensation and the issuing firm without the proceeds pursued with the IPO 
nor public status. (Brealey et al. 2014: 379; Ellis, Michaely & O’Hara 2000: 1042).  
 
The IPO process in full involves lots of stakeholders in addition to the issuing 
company and the underwriter or syndicate formed. External services including 
the underwriter are bought from financial, legal and auditing companies to 
perform due diligence analysis to prove the soundness of the firm and to make 
sure that markets are informed of the company and its intentions. Table 1 
describes the process in Finland according to the Pörssisäätiö (2016) with a 
timeline from start to finish and can be generalized to concern the Nordic stock 
exchanges under the NASDAQ group as Westerholm (2006) comments how the 
institutional aspects of Denmark, Finland and Sweden are quite harmonic. 
Generally, the procedure from an initial intention of going public to an IPO varies 
depending on the preparedness of a given company but a time frame can be 
generalized to be 6 to 12 months, although can be followed through much faster.  
 
 
 
    - Going through goals and needs (gains via an IPO)   
    - Choosing the underwriter and external advisors (financial, legal etc.) 
Preliminary work - Making deals with the counterparties regarding the process  
T- (6 to 12 months) - Surveying readiness for an IPO (size, profitability, investors' interest)  
    - Creating equity story and preliminary pricing    
    - Converting to applicable accounting standards if needed   
    - IPO plan, schedule and fulfilling requirements    
    - Meetings with Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) and the Exchange  
Preparing the IPO - Due diligence process starts      
T - (3 to 6 months) - Pricing continues        
    - Drafting prospectus        
    - Planning the issuance and its marketing    
    - Preparing for increasing disclosure requirements  
    - Finishing prospectus      
Detailing and decision - Presentation to Exchanges listing committee    
to issue equity  - Drafting terms and conditions for the IPO    
T - (1 to 3 months) - Getting prospectus accepted by the FSA   
    - Premarketing phase        
    - Application to IPO committee and press release    
    - Disclosure obligation begins     
IPO and applying as  - Prospectus becomes public      
a subject of trading - Releasing terms and conditions of the IPO    
T - (0 to 4 months) - Marketing the IPO to investors      
    - Board's final call on the IPO      
    - Exchange release on the new public company    
T                                                        TRADING BEGINS      
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The listing requirements and disclosure rules are harmonized between the 
Nasdaq Nordic Main Exchanges and there are only minor differences between 
Danish, Finnish and Swedish First North market places due to national 
legislation (Nasdaq 2019). Companies seeking to list their equity in either of the 
marketplaces need to disclose all information that may have an effect on their 
valuation in a manner that reaches all market participants simultaneously. Table 
2 below depicts the key requirements to be listed in one of the Nordic Main 
markets or First North according to Nasdaq (2019):  
 
 
 
Key requirements for a listing on Nordic Main Markets      
- At least three years of financial and operating history     
- Proof of working capital to last at least for 12 months following an IPO   
- Corporate governance criteria regarding board composition, financial controls 
   and disclosure liability           
- At least 25 % of the shares must be owned by the general public prior to an IPO 
- Market value of at least 1 million euros          
- Listing prospectus              
                
Key requirements for a listing on First North        
- Company must be incorporated according to the laws of its establishment 
- At least 10 % of the shares must be owned by general public on a continuous basis 
- Minimum offer price of 50 Euro cents          
- Firm must publish a company description or prospectus in some cases    
- Company must have a contract with a Certified Advisor at all times    
- Company must be able to disclose information to market at a timely and reliable manner 
- Company must follow accounting standards with applicable laws   
- Proof of earnings capacity or sufficient working capital to last 12 months following an IPO 
 
 
The two market places differ slightly with the requirements faced for an IPO. 
Main market companies need to be more established with proof of operating and 
financial history, whereas First North companies do not possess this 
requirement. All though, First North companies do have a requirement to show 
earnings potential or proof of working capital sufficiency similarly to Main 
Market companies. Public float is also a bit different as First North companies are 
required to have only 10 % of all shares outstanding to be held by the general 
public, whereas Main Market companies need to have at least 25 % of shares in 
Table 2. Listing requirements for Main and First North markets (Nasdaq 2019). 
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public holding before commencing an IPO. All though not visible from the table 
2, First North Premier companies have stricter requirements that are almost fully 
harmonized with the Main Market requirements.  
 
 
4.3. IPO valuation  
 
Valuing the company is an integral part of the IPO process and is run throughout 
the procedure multiple times due to possible new information alongside the 
process that could affect an initial valuation made in the get-go. In the literature 
review previously, initial public offerings suffer from underpricing (see e.g. 
Ibbotson 1975; Loughran et al. 1994) that culminates in abnormal first-day gains. 
In order to decrease large abnormal first-day gains and companies not “leaving 
money on the table” for investors to feast on, valuation of IPOs should be done 
by practicing extreme care, employing multiple methods.  
 
Underwriters are responsible for the valuation process and they should operate 
with multiple valuation methods to arrive at a reasonable share price range for 
an IPO. Regardless of the rigorous use of the various valuation metrics, 
Roosenboom (2012) documents underwriter biased discounting in the fair value 
of the preliminary offer, which is further reasoned to accelerate underpricing. 
The author also documents that the underwriters most often perform discounted 
cash flow analysis, conduct a dividend discount model and use valuation 
multiples to perform a sanity check in the process of determining a fair value for 
an issue. Valuation multiples are important to benchmark the price of a company 
going public with the rest of the industry, and also often given high emphasis 
during hot market conditions as discussed previously.  
  
4.3.1. Discounted cash flow method  
 
In the model, estimated future free cash flows of a company are discounted in 
the present moment and summed, consequently forming the company value. The 
model is quite the lifesaver in cases, where dividends are not commonly paid and 
the dividend discount model would either be virtually impossible to conduct or 
deliver imprecise results at best. The DCF model is also considered as a safe 
choice because it is not bothered by dividend payment policy nor financial 
statement arrangements such as deferrals. The model is only reliant on cash flows 
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in and out of the company during a financial period. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2014: 
617; Kallunki & Niemelä 2012: 224-225.) 
 
In order to perform the discounted cash flow valuation, one needs to determine 
the free cash flows first. The free cash flow can be determined either for the whole 
company (FCFF) or for equity (FCFE) (Bodie et al. 2014: 617). When calculating 
FCFF, capital expenditures and change in net working capital (𝛥𝑁𝑊𝐶) are 
deducted and depreciation added to earnings before interest and taxes (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇) 
adjusted with the after-tax term (1 − 𝑡𝑐). The formula according to Bodie et al. 
(2014: 618) is demonstrated below:  
 
(1) 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇(1 − 𝑡𝑐) + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 −
                        𝛥𝑁𝑊𝐶 
 
When calculating the free cash flow for equity (FCFE), after-tax adjusted interest 
expenses are subtracted from the FCFF and change in net debt is added. The 
formula for FCFE according to Bodie et al. (2014: 618) is described below: 
 
(2)  𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸 = 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑥 (1 − 𝑡𝑐) + 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
 
The formulas above are just one way to calculate FCFF and FCFE. The importance 
in the DCF calculation lies behind the discount rate that should not be 
mismatched with the type of cash flow. When using FCFF, the discount rate is 
obtained by using WACC. Reciprocally when free cash flow for equity is being 
discounted, the evaluator should use the cost of equity as the discount factor, 
which can be obtained for example with the CAPM or multifactor models. Using 
an accurate discount rate is essential, since it has a big impact on the valuation 
outcome, meaning that using a distorted discount factor results in corrupt 
valuation quickly. (Kallunki & Niemelä 2012: 225; Koller, Goehardt & Wessels 
2015: 42-43).   
 
It goes without saying that the free cash flow model faces challenges. Estimating 
future cash flows is difficult and gets remarkably problematic after the first few 
years of the forecast even when there is a good amount of data to track. In theory, 
companies are founded to be eternal, thus leading to an infinite amount of cash 
flows to be discounted in the present moment when performing a DCF valuation. 
Calculating infinite cash flows is not reasonable, which is why analysts usually 
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take an arbitrary point of view in the length of the forecast, ranging from a few 
to ten years (Brealey et al. 2014: 94). 
 
In furtherance of getting cash flows beyond the forecast period, one needs to 
determine the terminal value of cash flows at the last discount period, which 
considers the problem that the going concern mentality induces (Koller et al. 
2015: 145). Terminal value of cash flows is used because of increasing uncertainty 
in future cash flows and for practical matters for not having to estimate these 
uncertain cash flows reaching infinity. Choosing a suitable growth rate for 
terminal year cash flow is difficult and should not be chosen to be greater than 
the average growth rate of economy on infinite periods, because this results in 
value that would surpass the combination of all companies in the world over 
time, which simply is not realistic (Palepu et al. 2016: 363). Determining future 
growth rate precisely is a difficult task and plays a big part in the terminal value, 
which adds uncertainty into the calculation (Bodie et al. 2014: 621).   
 
Finance textbooks say that terminal value for free cash flow can be calculated in 
different ways either by the usage of different multiples (e.g. earnings or EBIT) 
or by employing the terminal cash flow, perpetuity growth and discount factor 
(Bodie et al. 2014: 618; Brealey et al. 2014: 94-95; Palepu et al 2015: 366-367). 
Recently mentioned textbooks suggest the use of steady growth discounted cash 
flow formula as the most common one in use. In the model, the terminal year free 
cash flow (𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑛) is divided with the subtraction of discount factor and assumed 
long-term growth rate. The calculus for terminal value is demonstrated below:  
 
(3) 𝑇𝑉 =  
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑛
(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟−𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑡
  
 
The formula for determining company value using free cash flows including the 
terminal value goes in the following way: Estimated free cash flows (𝐹𝐶𝐹) of each 
year and the terminal value (𝑇𝑉) at time t are divided by the yearly discount 
factors (1 + 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)𝑡 and added together forming the present value of the 
company (𝑃0).   
 
(4)  𝑃0 =
𝐹𝐶𝐹1
1+𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶
+  
𝐹𝐶𝐹2
(1+𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)2
+
𝐹𝐶𝐹3
(1+𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)3
 + . . . + 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡
(1+𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)𝑡
+ 
𝑇𝑉
(1+𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)𝑡
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Intuitive from the formula number 4, having a higher cost of capital results in 
bigger denominators in the equation, which will lead to lower net present value 
of the company. Therefore, considering even slightest changes in the valuation 
inputs have a remarkable effect on the output and multiple different scenarios 
should be made with different figures.   
 
4.3.2. Dividend discount model  
 
Another often employed valuation method based on the future payoffs generated 
by the company is the dividend discount model (DDM). The model uses future 
dividends as a proxy in determining the intrinsic value of a company. According 
to the model, the present value of a firm is the summation of its future dividends 
for shareholders. On occasions with no dividends in the near future e.g. with 
growth companies that invest aggressively, the method is difficult to apply, 
though fundamentally correct in valuing equity. (Brealey et al 2014: 84).   
 
When there is sufficient dividend history recorded, the method is relatively 
nonchalant to apply even though future dividends must be forecasted. When 
there are no recorded dividends, the model faces immense problems and 
forecasting will be based on subjective assumptions. The model calculates 
estimated future dividends (𝐷) from year one onwards and discounts them to 
the present moment by using the cost of equity (𝑟𝑒 + 1)
𝑡 as the yearly discount 
factor (Brealey et al. 2014: 81-82). The model is mathematically illustrated in the 
following form:  
 
(5) 𝑃0 =  
𝐷1
(1+𝑟𝑒)
+ 
𝐷2
(1+𝑟𝑒)
2 +
𝐷3
(1+𝑟𝑒)
3  +. . . + 
𝐷𝑡
(1+𝑟𝑒)
𝑡 
 
Similarly to the free cash flow calculation, the present value of the company is 
dependent on the assumptions made in both denominators and nominators. 
Moreover, the cost of equity and future dividends dictate the present value of the 
company in the dividend discount model. The more expensive equity capital 
becomes over time or a lesser amount of dividends it is expected to distribute to 
shareholders, the less the company is worth today.  
 
Since forecasting dividends indefinitely is a tedious task and produces high 
chances of error, a more pragmatic point of view has been developed. Gordon’s 
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growth formula disregards the calculation of yearly dividends to the 
unforeseeable future and rather assumes a steady growth rate for the next year 
dividend to take into account the future dividends. (Brealey et al. 2014: 84) The 
model’s algebraic illustration is the following:  
 
(6) 𝑃0 =  
𝐷1
𝑟𝑒−𝑔
 
 
Intuitive from the formula above, the stock price is dependent on three factors: 
forecasted next year dividend (𝐷1), cost of equity (𝑟𝑒)  and growth rate of the 
future dividends (𝑔).  The stock price is positively correlated with higher next 
year dividend and growth rate of the future dividends, whilst negatively related 
with the cost of equity. The formula faces some limitations as the growth rate of 
dividends cannot be assumed to surpass the cost of equity, which would yield 
negative stock value. Similarly, the growth rate of future dividends cannot be 
extremely close to the cost of equity due to the infinitely high stock prices when 
denominator approaches zero (Brealey et al. 2014: 84).  
 
4.3.3. Market approach to valuation 
 
Companies looking to execute an IPO might be young firms with no reliable track 
record, which are generally difficult to value with either cash flow or dividend 
discount methods that depend on a firm’s ability to generate cash flows to a 
company and its owners. Therefore, using accounting data to form multiples is a 
standard practice in valuing such companies (Ritter & Kim 1999: 409). In 
addition, investors value companies basing on existing companies’ values and 
are suspicious of companies whose value deviates from the average of a specific 
industry’s multiple under investigation.  
 
When companies are appraised from the perspective of the market, a comparable 
group of companies and their respective multiples formed from accounting 
information are exploited to form a fair value of the business under evaluation. 
This can be done by examining similar public companies and their multiples, 
recent public market transactions or by inspecting private business transactions 
attainable from databases. In order to get a hold of the value, one needs to employ 
valuation multiples as a proxy to reflect the value of a comparable company. In 
theory, utilizing the market approach should provide the same value as the 
previously seen DCF and DDM methods due to the same fundamentals 
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ultimately driving the value in each approach. Evidently, forming a fair value via 
market approach stresses the fact that comparable companies are valued 
correctly based on their intrinsic value and are not priced by irrational investor 
sentiment. (Bernström 2014: 5-6.) 
 
Often used multiples employ company’s market price (P) or enterprise value 
(EV) divided with various accounting metrics to arrive with a price that the 
company should be traded in the markets. As a sign of versatility, Bernström 
(2014: 43) notes how multiples can be generated for industry-specific reasons, 
employing variables that are characteristic or important in describing the value 
created in a certain industry. 
 
4.3.4. Price multiples  
 
The price multiples compare the market value of equity to various parameters 
such as earnings and sales. The price-earnings multiple enjoys fame granted by 
investors. It is coined nearly a hundred years ago and is still in common use and 
a relevant metric. What the P/E-ratio defines, is the amount of time it would take 
for the company to pay back the market value of equity with its earnings. The 
ratio is calculated by dividing the market value of equity capital with the net 
income, or the market value per share divided with earnings per share. (Kallunki 
& Niemelä 2012: 189-195.) The formula is demonstrated below: 
 
(7)  𝑃/𝐸 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
=  
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
  
 
The P/E-ratio can be trailing or forward-looking, meaning that it can be derived 
by trailing historical P/E-ratios or forecasting the future earnings and their 
growth (Palepu et al. 2015: 313). Regardless of which way of approaching is used, 
the data reliability arises in a key position (Bernström 2014: 50). Kim and Ritter 
(1999) make a finding in their study on IPO valuation that suggests forward-
looking P/E-ratio much more accurate than the historical values trailing one even 
though it requires forecasting of volatile future earnings. On the other hand, 
history does not necessarily act as good guarantee on future success than what 
more dynamic forward-looking measures do.  
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All though the P/E-ratio definitely is widely recognized and well kept, it is not a 
ubiquitous method that applies in every situation. In cases of negative earnings 
the ratio gets a negative value, and when earnings are zero or close to zero, the 
ratio is uninterpretable (Kallunki & Niemelä 2012: 198). In most cases, IPO 
companies do have revenues and earnings as they are required to show at least 
earnings potential and sufficiency of working capital as seen in the requirements 
to be admitted in a Nordic exchange previously in this chapter.  
 
4.3.5. Enterprise value multiples  
 
Valuation by enterprise value multiples is done by dividing the market value of 
invested capital (EV) by various metrics available from income and cash flow 
statements. In practice, these metrics are e.g. EBITDA, sales and FCF (Bernström 
2014: 40). The enterprise value based models are better than P/E-ratio because 
they take company debt level into account. Operating income and profits are also 
easier to interpret and tax level differences do not affect operating income and 
profits as they do in net income (Kallunki & Niemelä (2012: 204).  
 
After hearing such benefits, one could wonder why enterprise value based 
methods are not as popular as price based P/E-ratio among practitioners doing 
valuation. Once again, this can be reasoned by the easy calculation of P/E-ratio 
and vast availability of information to do a “quick and dirty” valuation of a 
company with a simple P/E-ratio.  
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
 
The following chapter discusses the data collected and the methodologies used 
to empirically test the developed hypotheses based on previous literature. The 
chapter is divided as follows: The dataset is introduced first and analyzed for 
descriptive purposes. Then the methodology is presented and fitted in the 
context of empirically testing the data concerning listed equity issues in the 
Nordic markets.  
 
 
5.1. Data  
 
The data gathered for this study come from a variety of sources. Information 
regarding the characteristics of the issue such as the number of shares, gross 
proceeds collected, offer price, sales and R&D expenditure are primarily 
gathered from listing prospectuses of the issues occurred in the Nordic countries 
from 2005 to 2015. The prospectuses’ information is further cross-checked by 
using news articles of the issuing company to see if there have been updates to 
the characteristics of the IPO after the prospectus has been released. 
 
The year 2005 was chosen as the starting point as initial public offerings started 
to occur more often after the turn of the millennium technology bubble and its 
aftermath and the year 2015 as the ending point to have 36 months of share price 
data to determine the long-term performance. Moreover, the prospectuses of 
companies gone public from 2005 onwards from Finnish issues, 2006 onwards 
from Swedish issues and from 2007 onwards from Danish issues are freely 
available from each country’s financial supervisory authority’s online archive. 
Prospectuses from Swedish and Danish issues not included in the financial 
supervisor’s web archives are collected by manual web searches.  
 
A range of exclusions have been made to arrive at the final sample of IPOs. First, 
stocks that have gone public in an alternative Nordic market place (e.g. 
Aktietorget and Bequoted in Sweden) are excluded from the sample and so are 
stocks that have switched lists from an alternative market place to main 
exchanges or First North market place. Secondly, banks and financial firms are 
not included in the sample as they have largely different debt and equity ratios 
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to non-financial firms. Thirdly, companies that have a primary listing elsewhere, 
are dual listed or if the home country of an issuer is not a Nordic nation are 
excluded. Fourthly, companies with no revenues the year prior to an exchange 
debut are omitted from the sample. Lastly, companies that have listed via a 
reverse acquisition, spinoff or a carve-out are excluded from the sample to 
include only the listings of companies with no previous trading history in order 
for the sample to represent “true” IPOs. Norwegian IPOs are excluded as the 
Oslo exchange does not belong to the NASDAQ Group, which governs the 
Danish, Finnish, Icelandic and Swedish First North and Main markets. Icelandic 
IPOs are also excluded from the sample due to the markets’ outlier nature, very 
small size and high amount of financial firms listing to the market place. These 
exclusions provide a sample of 136 IPOs in the three Nordic countries for the 11 
year time period from 2005 to 2015.  
 
The sample includes IPOs of companies that have delisted after their initial 
public offering either due to an acquisition or financial distress. In event-time 
setting, the last observable time period for these companies are utilized and in 
calendar-time setting the returns of last month of public trading are taken into 
consideration. Therefore, survivorship bias is not present in the sample as all 
IPOs included in the sample are also imported to the analyses, regardless of the 
length of their history as a publicly traded enterprise.   
 
Stock price data for the issuing companies’ are collected from Datastream as well 
as from the NASDAQ OMX Nordic website. As a benchmark for the IPO returns 
in event-time analysis each country’s capped price indices are used to adjust raw 
returns with market returns and the MSCI Nordic price index is used as the 
benchmark in the calendar-time analysis due to portfolios including IPOs from 
each of the three countries. The price indices ignore dividends and they are not 
taken into account on firm-specific level either in this study. Stock splits, 
however, are taken into account with the adjusted prices. As the risk-free rate in 
calendar-time regressions the 1-month Euribor rate is used.  
 
Accounting data, if not retrieved from individual prospectus, are derived from 
Datastream and Orbis. Moreover, the sales and R&D expenditure prior to 
exchange admission are mainly checked from the company publications in order 
to avoid noise in the data that that is in pronounced position especially for the 
smallest firms that are also scarcely available from Datastream and Orbis.  
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According to Pörssisäätiö (2018), during the sample period there occurred a total 
of 479 IPOs in Danish, Finnish and Swedish markets including alternative market 
places in Sweden and switches between exchange lists that are in a pronounced 
role in the Swedish initial public offerings scene. Conferring to Nasdaq (2019), 
through the life of Swedish First North market place, on average five companies 
yearly have switched from First North to Main Market. Also, a majority of the 
companies IPOing in Sweden during the sample period have been already 
publicly traded companies in either of the smaller alternative market places or 
First North switching between lists. Some of the list switchers have issued new 
equity in the process, whilst others have merely been content with switching to 
a more widely known market place in order to gain awareness of the company 
and its business. Regardless of the motives for an exchange switch, these list 
switching companies are excluded from the sample altogether.   
 
The offer price, if not fixed, is calculated as a weighted average from the price 
and shares allotted to institutional investors, individual investors and in some 
cases to personnel. Often times the weighted offer price is very close to the 
institutional investors and individual investors received price as they are allotted 
the most shares in an offering and the often substantially discounted personnel 
subscription prices pay therefore only a minor effect with small economic 
significance. The final offer price is also checked from press releases close to the 
issue date to see if the offer price has changed due to altered demand towards a 
company’s equity and in order be sure of the figures affecting underpricing.  
 
5.1.1. Descriptive statistics  
 
After considering all the necessary exclusions needed to make the sample as clean 
as possible from noise caused by list-switching companies and other “impure” 
IPOs, the final sample consists of 136 new equity issues occurred in the Danish, 
Finnish and Swedish markets during the 11 year time period from 2005 to 2015. 
The number of IPOs in the sample is left-skewed as there occurred quite 
substantially more initial public offerings in the last two observation years, 
whereas the first years were more moderate and the heart of financial crisis took 
its toll in listing activity in the midpoint of the sample.  Sweden is the biggest 
issuing nation with most activity in its market places as seen in figure 1 
previously. The country has more alternative market places than Denmark and 
Finland, which partially explains it, but also the sample including only First 
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North and Main market listings dwarfs the same figures of Denmark and 
Finland. Table 3 further shows the listing activity over the sample period in the 
three countries.   
 
 
Table 3. Distribution of IPOs included in the sample. 
Year Denmark Finland Sweden Total 
2005 1 2 5  8 
2006 5 2 5  12 
2007 4 2 6  12 
2008 2 0 2  4 
2009 1 0 0  1 
2010 3 0 6  9 
2011 0 0 6  6 
2012 0 1 2  3 
2013 1 2 4  7 
2014 2 5 23  30 
2015 1 9 34  44 
Total 20 23 93 136 
 
 
The descriptive statistics of the sample are displayed in table 4. The mean IPO in 
the sample was underpriced by 6.85 percent for the period, including outliers, 
which is lower than the average underpricing of 17.11 percent that Westerholm 
(2006) finds in his Nordic sample or the 15.62 percent average initial abnormal 
return of Hahl et al. (2014) sample of Finnish IPOs. The median underpricing of 
4.87 percent in the sample is expectedly lower than average due to the positive 
skew of underpricing. Westerholm documents a median value of 5.22 percent, 
which is far lower than the average underpricing in his sample. The result 
signifies a more adverse positive skew in his sample of Nordic IPO underpricing 
attributable to the sample period with high degree of underpricing among IPOs. 
 
The average sales prior to an IPO in the sample is about 384 Meur and average 
market capitalization at the offer price is about 330 Meur. Mean expenses towards 
research and development in the sample is 2.4 Meur and scaled to sales the mean 
expenses, or mean R&D intensity, is about 35 percent. Mean gross proceeds for 
the issues are almost 114 Meur. Median values are expectedly lower due to the 
inclusion of First North IPOs that are smaller on aggregate.  
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5.1.1. Constructing portfolios  
 
In this paper, the key distinction in dividing the sample IPOs in two groups is 
made by observing the research and development expenses of a company year 
prior to its exchange admission. A portfolio holding all companies is built for 
each analysis period and method, but also two additional portfolios are built 
similarly to Chan et al. (2001) depending on the question whether a firm had 
research and development expenses in the year prior to its exchange debut. Firms 
with R&D expenditure prior to an exchange admission are assigned to “R&D 
intensive” portfolio and firms with no expenditures to “R&D unintensive” 
portfolio. The portfolio holding all IPOs consists of 136 companies assuming a 
public status in either one of the sample countries, R&D intensive portfolio holds 
55 of those companies and the R&D unintensive portfolio 81 of the IPO 
companies.  
 
In order to synchronize differences in trading days between calendar months in 
the event-time analysis, an average number of trading days for each holding 
period are used. The one month event-time period includes 22, three month 
period 66, six month period 132, twelve month period 252 and thirty six month 
period 756 consecutive trading days. In the calendar-time analysis, the problem 
is tackled by including an IPO in a portfolio the month following its exchange 
debut and held there for either 6 or 36 months until dropping them from the 
portfolio, if not delisted before.  
Panel A             
Offer Characteristics  Mean Median Min. Max Std. N 
Underpricing 6.85 % 4.87 % -33.33 % 163.47 % 22.42 % 136 
Offer price EUR 6.57 5.29 0.52 58.32 6.65 136 
Proceeds MEUR 113.91 37.91 1.02 1335.78 199.63 136 
                
Panel B               
Firm Characteristics Mean Median Min. Max Std. N 
Age   25 15 0 155 29 136 
Market Cap. MEUR 329.56 86.72 4.23 3980.19 657.08 136 
Sales MEUR 383.59 33.56 0.01 10511.00 1327.25 136 
R&D MEUR 2.40 0.00 0.00 57.27 6.64 136 
R&D to Sales  35.05 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 2000.00 % 184.50 % 136 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics. 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics. 
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5.2. Methodology 
 
The aftermarket performance of issuing companies is examined from two points 
of view using event-time and calendar-time approaches in measuring short and 
long-term performances of the issuing companies. The short-term performance 
is studied by examining 1, 3 and 6 month periods’ returns in addition to the first-
day stock return following an exchange debut. The long-term returns are 
calculated by imitating similar periods as previous literature (see e.g. Ritter 1991; 
Keloharju 1993; Hahl et al. 2014; Amor and Kooli 2017) on using 12 and 36 month 
periods after the issue. If a firm is delisted before reaching its 36 months 
anniversary, the last quotation is implemented and company is omitted from 
subsequent periods reaching the three-year mark in a stock exchange. The sample 
includes 2 companies that do not last a full year in their respective market places 
and 6 companies that are delisted before 36 months of trading. Survivorship bias 
is omitted with these results in mind.  
 
5.2.1. Event-time returns  
 
First measuring the initial underpricing, event-time abnormal returns (AR) are 
calculated, which take into account the initial return of an issuing company 
adjusted to benchmark returns on the given issue day. The benchmark-adjusted 
initial abnormal returns for each issue at event-time t are calculated as: 
 
(8) 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  𝑟𝑖𝑡 −  𝑟𝑏𝑡 
 
In the formula above, 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the initial abnormal return for company i at time t. 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the return for company i at time t and 𝑟𝑏𝑡 is the return of the benchmark 
index at time t. The previous formula further elaborates to calculating the average 
abnormal returns in the following manner by taking an equally-weighted 
average of the benchmark adjusted returns of the sample IPOs: 
 
(9) 𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  
1
𝑛
 ∑ 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1   
 
The above formula sums up the abnormal returns of each issue and the result is 
the average abnormal return for a given portfolio. 𝐴𝑅𝑡 in the model depicts the 
average abnormal return at time t, 𝑛 is the number of IPOs and 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 denotes the 
abnormal return for a company 𝑖 at time t. Each IPO’s abnormal returns are 
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calculated by benchmarking the company’s stock market debut day return with 
its stock exchange’s capped price index return on the same day. Capped indices 
are used due to the inclusion of the First North listings and their aggregately 
smaller size compared to main listed companies. Using value weighted indices 
would therefore skew the benchmark returns to match those of the largest 
companies, especially harmful in the Finnish exchange where a big portion of the 
total market capitalization is firmly dictated by a few large corporations.  
 
Having calculated the average abnormal returns for the whole sample of IPOs, 
R&D intensive IPOs and R&D unintensive IPOs, the average values of each 
group are tested to see whether they differ significantly from zero i.e. if the 
groupings witness statistically significant underpricing. Calculating t-values to 
determine whether the abnormal returns significantly differ from zero is done in 
the following way by using the Student’s t-test: 
(10) 𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑅−0
𝑠
√𝑛
⁄
 
 
In the formula above, t denotes the test statistic for the Student’s t-test, AR is the 
average abnormal return, s denotes standard error and n signifies the number of 
companies for this instance.  In addition to testing the means of each IPO group, 
the medians are tested with the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to examine whether 
the median values differ significantly from zero as well. Following methods by 
Hahl et al. (2014), a comparison between the two IPO groups’ initial abnormal 
return means is done with an independent two-sample t-test of unequal sample 
sizes and variances (Welch’s t-test) to test the equality of means:  
 
(11)  𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡.𝑅&𝐷 − 𝐴𝑅𝑢𝑛.𝑅&𝐷
√(
𝑆2𝑖𝑛𝑡.𝑅&𝐷
𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡.𝑅&𝐷
 + 
𝑆2𝑢𝑛.𝑅&𝐷
𝑛𝑢𝑛.𝑅&𝐷
)
, 
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡.𝑅&𝐷 is the average abnormal returns of R&D intensive IPOs, whilst 
𝐴𝑅𝑢𝑛.𝑅&𝐷 is the average abnormal return of the R&D unintensive firms. 𝑆
2 
denotes variance and n is the number of initial public offerings in this instance. 
Similarly, the difference in medians is tested using the nonparametric Wilcoxon 
Ranked-sum test to examine whether the R&D intensive and R&D unintensive 
groups’ median initial abnormal returns differ significantly from each other.  
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In addition to the initial first day returns, 1, 3 and 6-month returns depicting 
short-term performance are also examined in this paper with the long-run 
performance for 12 and 36-month periods. Following methodology by Ritter 
(1991), Keloharju (1993) and Hahl et al. (2014) wealth relatives are used to 
measure benchmark-adjusted returns for the previously mentioned periods of 
short and long-term returns. Wealth relatives are implemented due to their 
nonchalant nature what comes to interpretation, and as Keloharju (1993: 258) 
notes, the included holding period return, required to calculate wealth relatives, 
does not require similar monthly rebalancing what CAR methods would do. If 
an attained wealth relative is above 1, a particular IPO has outperformed the 
benchmark and in a similar manner, an IPO underperforms with wealth relatives 
that are below the value of 1. Before calculating wealth relatives for each 
examination period, the holding period returns for each IPO for every 
examination period should be calculated first. Wealth relatives are examined on 
two different occasions by including the initial returns and by making an 
exclusion with the initial first-day gains of an offering. The holding period return 
for stock i at time t is calculated in the following manner in equation 12:  
 
(12) 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑡− 𝑃0
𝑃0
, 
 
where 𝑃𝑡  denotes the closing price of a stock in a certain measurement period 
and 𝑃0  is either the offer price or the closing price on the first day of trading. 
With the holding period returns calculated for each company at times t, the 
wealth relatives can be calculated for each of the short and long-term periods to 
see if there occurs abnormal returns in either direction in the following manner 
in equation 13:  
 
(13) 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  
(1+ 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 ) 
(1+ 𝑟𝑏𝑡)
 
 
In the formula above, 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡  denotes the wealth relative of stock i at time t. 
𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 depicts the holding period return of a stock i at time t, and 𝑟𝑏𝑡 is the 
benchmark return at time t. Similarly to average abnormal returns previously, 
the equally-weighted average of wealth relatives are calculated for all IPOs and 
the two sub groups in the following manner for each examination period as in 
equation 14 on the next page: 
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(14) 𝑊𝑅𝑡 =  
1
𝑛
 ∑ 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1  
 
𝑊𝑅𝑡 denotes the average wealth relative for period t, n is the number of IPOs in 
this instance and 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡 is an individual stock’s i wealth relative at time t. Similarly 
to testing initial abnormal returns, the mean wealth relatives are studied with the 
Student’s t-test to examine whether they differ significantly from the value of 
1.00, which signifies faring at par with the market. The median WRs significance 
is examined with the Wilcoxon Signed-rank test in a similar manner to measuring 
the median abnormal returns’ significance.  
 
(15) 𝑡 =  
𝑊𝑅−1
𝑠
√𝑛
⁄
 
 
In the equation 15, WR denotes the equally-weighted average wealth relative, s 
denotes standard deviation and n is the number of IPOs in this instance.  
Similarly in tests with average abnormal returns, the mean wealth relatives of the 
two subgroups are tested following Hahl et al. (2014) with the independent two-
sample t-test for unequal sample sizes and variances in the following manner: 
 
(16) 𝑡 =  
𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡.𝑅&𝐷 − 𝑊𝑅𝑢𝑛.𝑅&𝐷
√(
𝑆2𝑖𝑛𝑡.𝑅&𝐷
𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡.𝑅&𝐷
 + 
𝑆2𝑢𝑛.𝑅&𝐷
𝑛𝑢𝑛.𝑅&𝐷
)
, 
 
where 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑡.𝑅&𝐷 is the average wealth relative of the R&D intensive portfolio for 
the examination period under inspection, 𝑆2𝑖𝑛𝑡.𝑅&𝐷 is the variance of the R&D 
intensive portfolio and 𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡.𝑅&𝐷 is the number of IPOs in the R&D intensive 
portfolio, the same logic with the notations apply with the R&D unintensive 
portfolio as well in the formula. Lastly, the Wilcoxon Ranked-sum test is 
employed to examine whether the R&D intensive and R&D unintensive groups’ 
median WRs differ significantly from each other.  
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5.2.2. Calendar-time returns  
 
Following previous literature (e.g. Brav et al. 2000; Hahl et al. 2014 and Amore et 
al. 2017) risk-adjusted returns are also implemented to test the return 
characteristics of IPOs in the sample. The event-time returns completely discard 
the riskiness of an individual company and assumes that each IPO shares the 
same risk features. Therefore, the event-time analysis is accompanied by the 
calendar-time analysis utilizing factor models. Previous studies also note that 
IPO performance measurement is affected by the choice of methodologies and 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model has exerted insignificant results for 
abnormal returns and evidence of no abnormal performance compared to event-
time methods. In this paper, the abnormal IPO returns are regressed with 
multiple risk factors starting with the single factor Capital Asset Pricing Model.  
 
(17) 𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡)  +  𝜀𝑡   
 
Where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 depicts portfolio’s monthly excess return over the prevailing 
risk free rate for a given period, 𝛼𝑝 depicts the abnormal returns for a portfolio, 
𝛽1 is portfolio’s sensitivity to market returns, (𝑅𝑚𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the market risk 
premium and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term of the regression. The single factor model above 
seeks to explain stock returns by only using excess market returns, which has 
turned out to be an incomplete measure and further studies have proven other 
factors to explain stock returns. Fama and French (1993) come up with two 
additional risk factors that explain the cross-section of stock returns and 
introduce the three factor model that builds on the single factor model above:   
 
(18) 𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡) +  𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +  𝛽3HML + 𝜀𝑡   
 
The additional factor SMB depicts the return of small stocks minus the return of 
big stocks and HML describes the return of value stocks minus the return of 
growth stocks, proxied with the book-to-market ratio. Fama and French (1993) 
combined the already documented outperformance of small stocks over large 
ones and value stocks over growth stocks in long-run, which formulated in their 
analysis in the above risk factors to describe cross-sectional stock returns. 
 
The three-factor model is further augmented by Carhart (1997) into a four-factor 
model that includes the momentum factor, which depicts the return difference of 
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past winners and past losers. The author noticed on his examination of mutual 
fund managers that their performance was not attributable to superior stock 
picking skills per se, but was explainable with common factors that the asset 
pricing models did not take into account at the time.  
 
(19)  𝑅𝑝𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 +  𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) +  𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑀𝐿 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
In the above Carhart (1997) model, the additional WML factor explains the stock 
returns better than the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) as investor 
sentiment often affects the stock returns and stocks may engage in momentum 
generating positive alphas. The factor models were most recently updated by 
Fama and French (2015) five-factor and Fama and French (2018) six-factor 
models. The five-factor model incorporates two additional factors in the three-
factor model and six-factor model adds the Carhart (1997) momentum factor in 
the five-factor model. The Fama and French five-factor model (2015) is 
demonstrated in equation 20: 
 
(20) 𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡) +  𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊 +  𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴 + 𝜀𝑡   
 
The additional factors RMW and CMA are known as the profitability factor and 
investment factor, which add explanatory power to the previous three-factor 
model. RMW is the return of robust operating profitability companies minus the 
return of weak operating profitability companies, suggesting that profitability 
explains stock returns as first introduced by Novy-Marx (2013). The CMA factor 
measures the return difference of aggressively investing companies from 
conservative investors as a proxy for investment and average returns, an 
anomaly documented by Aharoni, Grundy and Zheng (2013).  
 
The six factor model by Fama and French (2018) includes the previous five factors 
and adds the Carhart (1997) momentum factor in the model. The six-factor model 
goes in the following way: 
 
(21) 𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡) +  𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊 +  𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴  
+ 𝛽6𝑊𝑀𝐿 +  𝜀𝑡 
 
All of the factor loadings used in this paper are on European level and 
downloaded from the Kenneth French data library, except for the excess market 
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return. As the market portfolio in this study, the monthly returns of the MSCI 
Nordic Countries Index are used due to the index’ better representativeness of 
the Nordic stock universe and its low about 10 % weight on Norwegian stocks 
and capped weights of companies, which gives smaller emphasis to the large-cap 
stocks in the country indices. The loadings are used on a monthly level and 
portfolios holding all IPOs, R&D intensive IPOs and R&D unintensive IPOs are 
constructed separately for 6 and 36-month periods. A company is included in a 
portfolio the month following its exchange debut and dropped 6 or 36 months 
after the portfolio inclusion. Equally weighted returns are calculated for each 
portfolio for each calendar month and excess returns are calculated by adjusting 
the monthly portfolio returns with the prevailing risk-free rate. The six-month 
portfolios suffer from thinness from time to time and few observation months 
have to be excluded from the calendar-time regressions due to no observations 
during those months. The 36-month portfolios are exempt from this problem 
because of the more abundant nature of IPOs in portfolios given by the longer 
holding period.  
 
 
5.3. Limitations of the study 
 
This study faces certain limitations. The final sample size will not be as big as 
have been in previous literature that focuses on the biggest equity markets in the 
world. Even when the Nasdaq Nordic markets are combined, the sample remains 
relatively small due to the range of exclusions made to preserve a pure sample of 
IPOs. Therefore, the results may not be fully compatible with the previous studies 
and certain patterns might get a pronounced position in the smaller market 
setting. If economic significance is found, statistical significance is more 
demanding to obtain and the results need to be interpreted with objectivity.  
 
The returns for each stock at given periods are obtained by observing the split-
adjusted price history, which discards return properties accompanied by firms 
paying out dividends, although controlled by using price indices as benchmarks. 
This may have an effect for the long-run results of companies with generous 
dividend policies, although IPO markets are usually more plentiful with younger 
companies with no intentions to pay out dividends and the exclusion of 
dividends should not as a result pay a significant role in this thesis.  
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6. RESULTS 
 
 
The results of the IPO aftermarket performance analyses are presented in this 
chapter. The methodologies and data presented in previous parts are put to 
practice with the data fitted to the presented models. The short-term 
performances are first examined in event-time on the first trading day and for 1, 
3 and 6 month periods and then in a calendar-time setting using a 6-month rolling 
portfolio to assess the difference in risk profiles of the portfolios that event-time 
analysis discards. The long-term performance is further assessed for 12 and 36 
month periods in event-time and for a 36-month rolling period in calendar-time.  
 
 
6.1. Abnormal initial returns    
 
Table 5 below depicts results for the initial returns adjusted for market returns 
for both IPO groups, their difference and for the whole sample as well. Mean and 
median abnormal initial returns are presented in this analysis and the 
significance of the means are tested with the Student’s and Welch’s t-tests, 
whereas the significance of medians are tested with the nonparametric Wilcoxon 
Signed-rank and Wilcoxon rank sum tests. The t-statistics (z-statistics) signifying 
statistical significance are presented below the mean (median) values and their 
level of significance adjusted for the degrees of freedom are denoted with 
asterisks, where * denotes significance at the 10 % level, ** denotes significance 
at the 5 % level and *** denotes significance at the 1 % level. 
 
 
 Table 5. Abnormal initial returns. 
    All IPOs  
R&D 
intensive  
R&D 
unintensive  
R&D int. – R&D 
unint. 
               
Mean   7.32 %  3.62 %  9.83 %  -6.22 %     
t-stat   3.73 ***  1.92 *  3.29 ***  -1.76 *    
Median   5.17 %  3.22 %  5.87 %  -2.65 %     
z-stat   4.18 ***  4.52 ***  6.41 ***  -0.89     
Max.   163.09 %  39.06 %  163.09 %       
Min.    -34.35 %  -34.35 %  -32.64 %       
St.dev.   0.23  0.14  0.27       
N   136  55  81       
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All new equity issues on average produced abnormal returns of 7.32 percent (5.15 
percent with outliers removed), which is in accordance with previous literature 
on IPOs being significantly underpriced and producing positive abnormal 
returns on their first trading day globally and in the sample countries (see e.g. 
Ibbotson 1975; Ritter 1991; Keloharju 1993; Westerholm 2006; Hahl et al. 2014). 
The median values are expectedly lower than the averages due to the few 
extreme positive observations in the sample, such as the maximum initial 
abnormal return of 163.09 percent. Also, the mean and median values are closer 
to each other as opposed to previous studies in the Finnish and Nordic markets 
due to the exclusion of the technology bubble and high levels of underpricing 
back then.  
 
An interesting notion is the considerably lower underpricing of R&D intensive 
companies compared to the R&D unintensive firms. The average abnormal initial 
returns for R&D intensive firms is only 3.62 percent, whereas R&D unintensive 
companies, on average, have initial abnormal returns of 9.83 percent. The mean 
difference of the underpricing between the two groups is also statistically 
significant. Referring to Li (2011), R&D intense companies should be more 
financially constrained and are more risky than firms with no R&D investments, 
and in the case of inclusion of smaller First North companies in the sample, the 
financial constraints are largest for the small R&D intensive companies. The 
results of initial abnormal returns are against the first hypothesis, which assumes 
that R&D intensive companies are more underpriced due to their high growth 
expectations granted by investors. The adverse relationship between investments 
towards R&D and underpricing could be the result of information asymmetry 
and investors being less convinced by investments to research and development 
in the R&D intense Nordic nations as opposed to the previous results by Guo et 
al. (2006) with U.S. data. 
 
 
6.2. Short-run performance  
 
Results of the short term performance for the sample IPOs measured by 1, 3 and 
6 month periods in event-time and for 6 month period in the calendar-time 
setting are presented here. The event-time approach includes using both initial 
returns adjusted wealth relatives and wealth relatives excluding the first day 
returns. Panels “a” in event-time wealth relative tables exclude the initial returns 
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and panels “b” include the initial returns. Calendar-time analysis omits the first 
trading day returns as companies are included in the rolling calendar-time 
portfolios the month following their exchange debut.  
 
Statistical significance of the regression factors are measured with the Student’s 
t-test for which the t-statistics are marked in parenthesis under the factor 
loadings and their statistical significance are further implied with asterisks, 
where * denotes significance at the 10 % level, ** denotes significance at the 5 % 
level and *** denotes significance at the 1 % level. The event-time mean and 
median significance are measured in a similar manner to the initial abnormal 
returns with the t-test and z-test and their significance are marked with the 
previously described asterisks as well. Table 6 shows the results for 1 month 
wealth relatives.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6. 1 month wealth relatives. 
    All IPOs  R&D intensive 
R&D 
unintensive R&D int. – R&D unint. 
Panel a: 1 month WRs excluding initial return           
Mean   0.99  0.97  1.00  -0.04   
t-stat   -0.61  -2.04 **  0.18  -1.22   
Median   0.97  0.97  0.97  0.0053   
z-stat   -2.92 ***  -2.32 **  -1.96 *  -0.14   
Max.   2.54  1.30  2.54     
Min.    0.64  0.67  0.64     
St.dev.   0.20  0.12  0.24     
N   136  55  81     
                   
Panel b: 1 month WRs including initial return           
Mean   1.04   1.00   1.07   -0.07   
t-stat   1.77 *  0.01   2.04 **  -1.58   
Median   1.00   1.00   1.00   -0.01   
z-stat   0.91   0.00   1.28   -0.86   
Max.   2.54   1.80   2.54       
Min.    0.53   0.57   0.53       
St.dev.   0.28   0.21   0.32       
N   136   55   81       
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A noteworthy finding table 6 is the IPO companies’ marginally poor and highly 
significant performance if the initial returns are not taken into consideration. 
R&D intensive firms’ subsequently poorer performance compared to unintensive 
firms continues when mean WRs are examined, but both groups and the whole 
sample have significant and equally poor median WRs if initial returns are 
excluded. When initial returns are included in the analysis, the R&D unintensive 
and whole sample of IPOs fare significantly better than their respective 
benchmark indices in terms of mean WRs, whilst the R&D intensive firms’ 
returns are positive but insignificant from the market returns. Mean and median 
differences are not significant as the differences are only slight and therefore the 
two groups do not differ meaningfully in terms of mean and median WRs. The 
result of R&D unintensive IPOs receiving better WRs for the 1 month period 
seems self-explanatory as the R&D unintensive companies are significantly more 
underpriced and realize higher initial returns, which in turn has a positive 
influence in their early aftermarket performance as documented by 
Purnanandam et al. (2004).  
 
 
Table 7. 3 month wealth relatives. 
     
All IPOs 
 
 
R&D intensive 
R&D 
unintensive 
 
R&D int- R&D unint.  
Panel a: 3 month WRs excluding initial 
return 
            
Mean   0.99 
 
0.96 
 
1.02 
 
-0.06 
 
t-stat   -0.23 
 
-1.45 
 
0.56 
 
-1.36 
 
Median   0.98 
 
0.97 
 
0.98 
 
-0.01 
 
z-stat   -0.92 
 
-1.01 
 
-0.39 
 
-0.42 
 
Max.   2.07 
 
1.33 
 
2.07 
   
Min.    0.29 
 
0.33 
 
0.29 
   
St.dev.   0.26 
 
0.20 
 
0.29 
   
N   136 
 
55 
 
81 
   
    
       
  
Panel b: 3 month WRs including initial  return 
     
  
Mean   1.05 
 
1.00 
 
1.08 
 
-0.09   
t-stat   1.71 * 
 
-0.12 
 
2.21 ** 
 
-1.62   
Median   1.03 
 
1.01 
 
1.05 
 
-0.04   
z-stat   1.33 
 
0.26 
 
1.72 * 
 
-1.07   
Max.   1.97 
 
1.73 
 
1.97 
  
  
Min.    0.23 
 
0.29 
 
0.23 
  
  
St.dev.   0.32 
 
0.29 
 
0.33 
  
  
N   136 
 
55 
 
81 
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The phenomenon of R&D unintensive companies performing better than the 
R&D intensive firms acknowledged with the initial returns and 1 month WRs 
continues in the 3 month observation period as seen in table 7. Without the initial 
returns taken into account, the R&D intensive companies lose to the markets at a 
similar magnitude as in the 1 month WR examination and R&D unintense 
companies perform at slightly higher figures, although both insignificantly.  
When initial returns are taken into account in panel “b”, the R&D unintensive 
companies significantly beat the market in mean and median terms, whereas the 
R&D intensive companies perform at par with the market with no significant 
difference. Similarly to 1 month performance in table 6, the portfolio holding all 
companies in table 7 performs at a similar level above market returns, suggesting 
the importance of initial returns in the short-term holding of IPO firms. 
 
Hahl et al. (2014) find similar underperformance with the 1 month WRs 
excluding initial returns providing an insignificant mean value of 0.97 for all IPOs 
but statistically significant median values of 0.97 for value IPOs and portfolio 
holding all IPOs. As opposed to results in table 6 panel “b”, Hahl et al. (2014) find 
greater outperformance for IPO companies when initial returns are included in 
the analysis, which can be reasoned with the sample period from 1994 to 2006 
they used in their paper. The sample period includes the technology boom that 
arrogated very high initial returns for companies listed during that time, 
contributing to high 1 and 3 month WRs when initial returns are included. The 
mean differences in panels “a” and “b” are not significant, but witness similar 
pattern in both tables 6 and 7 with values bordering statistically significant 
standards, whereas medians are more indifferent from each other.  
 
Table 8. 6 month wealth relatives. 
    All IPOs  R&D intensive 
R&D 
unintensive R&D int. – R&D unint. 
Panel a: 6 month WRs excluding initial return           
Mean   1.02   0.97   1.06  -0.09   
t-stat   0.64   -0.69   1.16   -1.32   
Median   0.98   0.92   1.00   -0.08   
z-stat   -0.37   -1.10   0.41   -1.18   
Max.   3.03   1.94   3.03       
Min.    0.14   0.33   0.14       
St.dev.   0.39   0.31   0.43       
N   136   55   81       
61 
 
Panel b: 6 month WRs including initial return           
Mean   1.08   1.02   1.12   -0.11   
t-stat      2.04 **  0.32       2.29 **  -1.37   
Median   1.04   1.02   1.05   -0.03   
z-stat   1.36   -0.06     1.76 *   -1.13   
Max.   3.40   2.68   3.40       
Min.    0.11   0.30   0.11       
St.dev.   0.46   0.41   0.49       
N   136   55   81       
 
 
Yet again in table 8 analysis of the 6 month WRs, the previously documented 
short-run pattern seems to be present in the sample as IPOs fare significantly 
better after including the initial returns in calculating the WRs. R&D intensive 
companies underperform the market in a similar mean figure as in the previous 
time periods but the median value suggests more adverse performance for R&D 
intensive companies than in the shorter horizons, although both of the values are 
statistically insignificant. Median WR in the panel “a“ for all IPOs is also below 
1.00 and suggests deteriorating performance for the IPO companies 6 months 
after being publicly traded.   
 
WRs including the initial returns, on the other hand, propose that all IPOs once 
again perform better than the market for the given time period and the economic 
significance is also higher than was in the shorter time periods, suggesting that 
investing to IPOs for 6 months provides superior returns to markets for short-
run in event-time analysis. Furthermore, screening companies with no R&D 
expenses would be a superior bet in determining the short-term performance of 
IPOs in Nordics with the highest mean and median WRs for the time period with 
statistical significance.  
  
Hahl et al. (2014) find similar pattern in short-run, where the IPOs return poorly 
during the 1 month of trading if bought at the first day closing price but gradually 
move away from the slump. Also, the IPOs provide economically and statistically 
significantly better returns than the market if the stocks are bought at the initial 
public offering. The importance of buying the issuing stock at the offer is in 
pronounced position in the Hahl et al. (2014) analysis due to high initial returns, 
which most likely is one of the root causes behind the high WRs in their sample 
for the observed periods compared to the ones obtained in this study.   
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The calendar-time regressions for the short-run show quite similar results to 
event-time analysis. In table 9, the results for a portfolio holding all IPOs for six 
months are presented. Initial inspection brings interesting observation implying 
that the portfolio holding all companies has a beta of 0.496 in the one factor 
CAPM regression, which seems very low, considering that the market has a beta 
of exactly 1. The companies are, in the short run, very defensive and seem not to 
move in tight accordance with the market. The HML factor describes that the 
portfolio holding all IPOs for a rolling 6 month period has value exposure and 
the returns are driven by value IPOs with high book-to-market ratios.  
 
Each of the regression alphas are negative, proposing that the IPOs perform 
worse than markets, albeit the coefficients are statistically insignificant. The 
regressions show similar results as the previous event-time inspection, where the 
6 month WRs excluding initial returns have mean and median values of 1.02 and 
0.98, although both statistically insignificant. The six-factor model has the lowest 
negative and closest to being significant alpha, which suggests that the factor 
models do not capture the cross-sectional stock returns of the IPO companies, but 
Table 9. Calendar-time regressions of rolling 6 month portfolio holding all IPOs. 
6 MONTH 
PORTFOLIO CAPM   2-factor    3-factor   4-factor   5-factor   6-factor   
All IPOs                         
α -0.007  -0.007  -0.005  -0.011  -0.008  -0.012   
  (-1.059)  (-1.052)  (-0.778)  (-1.435)  (-1.024)  (-1.512)   
Rm – Rf 0.496 ***  0.493 ***  0.419 ***  0.426 ***  0.350 **  0.328 **  
  (3.868)  (3.830)  (3.148)  (3.224)  (2.199)  (2.067)   
SMB   0.155  0.201  0.183  0.186  0.090   
    (0.446)  (0.582)  (0.521)  (0.502)  (0.241)   
HML     0.630 *  0.870 **  1.290 **  1.499 ***  
      (1.907)  (2.380)  (2.449)  (2.772)   
WML       0.404    0.782   
        (1.530)    (1.060)   
RMW         0.971  -0.723   
          (1.328)  (-1.123)   
CMA         -0.527  0.417   
          (-0.829)  (1.539)   
Adj. R^2 0.107  0.100  0.121  0.132  0.127  0.137   
F-stat 14.961 ***  7.528 ***  6.346 ***  5.431 ***  4.403 ***  4.109 ***  
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adding more factors to the model increases the explanatory power describing all 
IPOs returns, although the adjusted R^2s remain low for each regression.   
  
 
 
 
 
In table 10, the results are similar to the event-time analysis. All of the regression 
alphas are negative and also significant at conventional levels in the 4 and 6-
factor models, suggesting that R&D intensive IPOs lose to the MSCI Nordic 
benchmark index in the 6 month period after exchange inauguration. 
Interestingly, the R&D intensive portfolio’s returns are value stock-driven, 
similar to the portfolio holding all IPOs, but with slightly greater magnitude. The 
returns of 6 month portfolio holding R&D intensive companies are also explained 
with momentum factor that shows a positive and significant effect in 4 and 6-
factor models similar to Hahl et al. (2014) short-run regressions. Deviating from 
previous literature (see e.g. Purnanandam & Swamintaham 2004; Hahl et al. 
2014) the sample IPOs returns are not driven by the small size effect as the SMB 
loadings are insignificant in all of the regressions.  
 
Table 10. Calendar-time regressions of rolling 6 month portfolio holding R&D intensive IPOs. 
6 MONTH 
PORTFOLIO CAPM   2-factor    3-factor   4-factor   5-factor   6-factor   
R&D Intensive IPOs                       
α -0.011  -0.011  -0.009  -0.019 **  -0.014  -0.022 **  
  (-1.301)  (-1.393)  (-1.126)  (-2.128)  (-1.470)  (-2.274)  
Rm – Rf 0.797 ***  0.817 ***  0.721 ***  0.584 ***  0.677 ***  0.506 **  
  (4.322)  (4.442)  (3.772)  (2.979)  (3.358)  (2.419)  
SMB   0.660  0.637  0.507  0.654  0.423  
    (1.446)  (1.408)  (1.112)  (1.401)  (0.910)  
HML     0.748 *  1.218 **  1.422 **  1.864 ***  
      1.657  (2.490)  (2.073)  (2.687)  
WML       0.907 **    0.942 **  
        (2.341)    (2.394)  
RMW         0.993  0.716  
          (1.049)  (0.770)  
CMA         -0.767  -1.080  
          (-0.871)  (-1.244)  
Adj. R^2 0.156  0.165  0.180  0.220  0.183  0.224  
F-stat 18.684 ***  10.496 ***  8.042 ***  7.791 ***  5.320 ***  5.619 ***  
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The regressions results of the portfolio holding R&D unintensive IPOs in table 11 
suggest that these companies fare no better or worse than the benchmark index 
for the six month period, which held also true in the event-time analysis for the 
same period excluding the initial return from the first day of trading. The factor 
models seem to be incapable of describing the return characteristics of the 6 
month portfolio of R&D unintensive IPOs as the adjusted R^2s are very low and 
only the 5-factor model shows significance for factors other than the excess 
market return.    
 
Comparing the factor loadings on SMB, although all of them insignificant, 
suggest that the R&D unintensive portfolio is affected by big companies’ returns, 
whereas the R&D intensive portfolio is tilted towards small companies. Similarly, 
the return characteristics of the momentum factor is opposite in the R&D 
intensive portfolio, where past winners explain the portfolio returns and in the 
case of R&D unintensive portfolio is tilted towards past losers, although the 
result is not significant in the 4 and 6 factor models in table 11.  
 
 
6 MONTH 
PORTFOLIO CAPM  2-factor  3-factor  4-factor  5-factor  6-factor   
R&D Unintensive 
IPOs                       
α 0.001  0.001  0.002  0.005  0.001  0.003   
  (0.221)  (0.223)  (0.338)  (0.658)  (0.136)  (0.399)  
Rm - Rf 0.417 ***  0.415 ***  0.381 ***  0.377 ***  0.308 **  0.317 **  
  (3.580)  (3.543)  (3.106)  (3.071)  (2.080)  (2.132)  
SMB   0.079  0.097  0.121  0.028  0.076   
    (0.241)  (0.296)  (0.359)  (0.078)  (0.210)  
HML     0.289  0.161  0.811 *  0.705   
      (0.952)  (0.471)  (1.661)  (1.384)  
WML       -0.191    -0.191   
        (-0.777)    (-0.752)  
RMW         0.686  0.769   
          (1.003)  (1.108)  
CMA         -0.557  -0.462   
          (-0.955)  (-0.773)  
Adj. R^2 0.103  0.095  0.094  0.090  0.095  0.0911   
F-stat 12.814 ***  6.377 ***  4.550 ***  3.548 ***  3.166 ***  2.721 ***  
Table 11. Calendar-time regressions of rolling 6 month portfolio holding R&D unintensive IPOs. 
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6.3. Long-run performance  
 
The results of the performance analysis for the 12 and 36 month periods are 
shown in this chapter in event and calendar-time. The event-time returns are first 
introduced and then the calendar-time analyses are further discussed and 
compared.   
 
 
Table 12. 12 month wealth relatives. 
    All IPOs  R&D intensive 
R&D 
unintensive R&D int. - R&D unint. 
Panel a: 12 month WRs excluding initial return             
Mean   1.10  1.11  1.09  0.02    
t-stat   1.89 *  1.21  1.48  0.17    
Median   1.05  1.09  1.02  0.07    
z-stat   1.08  0.96  0.57  0.43    
Max.   5.14  5.14  3.72      
Min.    0.11  0.18  0.11      
St.dev.   0.62  0.70  0.56      
N   134  55  79      
Panel b: 12 month WRs including initial return         
Mean   1.15  1.14  1.16  -0.02     
t-stat   2.82 ***  1.68 *  2.29 **  -0.17     
Median   1.09  1.17  1.07   0.10     
z-stat   2.22 **  1.42  1.61   0.11     
Max.   4.17  3.85  4.17       
Min.    0.10  0.22  0.10       
St.dev.   0.62  0.62  0.61       
N   134  55  79       
 
 
Reaching the one year anniversary in the wealth relatives brings interesting 
results. First of all, two R&D unintensive companies have been delisted before 
being publicly traded for a full year. In table 12, the average wealth relative for 
all IPOs excluding initial returns reaches statistical significance and a value of 
1.10, signifying that IPO companies have outperformed the market for that 
period. Also, the tables have turned, and R&D intensive companies have a higher 
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mean and median WRs in the panel “a” than the unintensive companies, albeit 
all of them are statistically insignificant.  
 
When initial returns are included, the positive performance becomes even more 
pronounced in favor of the IPO firms. In table 12 panel “b”, a highly significant 
mean WR of 1.15 is achieved for all IPOs in the 12 month period. The R&D 
intensive and unintensive firms fare almost equally well with significant mean 
WRs of 1.14 and 1.16, respectively. Median WR is also significant for all IPOs, 
whereas the subgroups have insignificant median WRs, although the R&D 
intensive group possesses the highest median value of all groups. The result and 
higher standard deviations of the WRs could signify that the investments in R&D 
are more volatile than capital investments, generally mispriced by investors and 
take a longer time to realize as positive stock market gains as hypothesized by 
Chan et al. (2001) and Kothari et al. (2002). The mean and median differences are 
not significant in either panels as the returns for both subgroups show similar 
characteristics for the examined time horizon. 
 
 
 
    All IPOs  R&D intensive 
R&D 
unintensive R&D int. - R&D unint. 
Panel a: 36 month WRs excluding initial return             
Mean   1.12  1.05  1.18  -0.13     
t-stat   1.53  0.41  1.61  -0.83     
Median   1.07  0.96  1.15  -0.19     
z-stat   0.22  -0.51  0.98  -0.99    
Max.   6.37  4.84  6.37       
Min.    0.00  0.00  0.05       
St.dev.   0.91  0.83  0.95       
N   130  54  76       
Panel b: 36 month WRs including initial return             
Mean   1.16  1.05  1.24  -0.19     
t-stat   1.96 *  0.48  2.03 **  -1.20     
Median   1.12  0.88  1.17  -0.29     
z-stat   0.93  -0.22  1.51  -1.11     
Max.   7.15  3.63  7.15       
Min.    0.00  0.00  0.03       
St.dev.   0.92  0.76  0.99       
N   130  54  76       
Table 13. 36 month wealth relatives. 
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In a 36 month period following the IPOs, the WRs receive more inconclusive 
values. All mean values suggest that IPOs outperform benchmarks, regardless of 
the categorization of companies or inclusion of initial returns, although 
significantly only in two occasions. R&D unintensive IPOs are found to 
outperform the market most prominently with statistical significance when 
initial returns are included. WRs of all IPOs also show significant evidence in 
favor of the IPO companies faring better than the benchmarks. Median values of 
the R&D intensive companies are below 1.00 in both panels, but the figures are 
not significant.  The standard deviations are very high due to some observations 
nearing bankruptcy and others returning multiple times the market return in a 
three year period after an initial public offering.   
 
 
 
 
In table 14 above, the results of the factor regressions for the portfolio including 
all IPOs for a 36 month rolling period are shown. The beta coefficient for the 
portfolio is still rather low, suggesting that the sample IPOs are also defensive on 
the 36 month period as was the case with the 6 month portfolio. Each of the alphas 
are insignificant, proposing that the IPO companies do not outperform the 
36 MONTH 
PORTFOLIO  CAPM   2-factor    3-factor   4-factor   5-factor   6-factor   
ALL IPOs                         
α 0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  
  (-0.151)  (-0.471)  (-0.472)  (-0.418)  (-0.844)  (-0.818)  
Rm – Rf 0.700 ***  0.690 ***  0.691 ***  0.689 ***  0.673 ***  0.673 ***  
  (11.852)  (12.828)  (12.110)  (11.713)  (9.687)  (9.652)  
SMB   0.865 ***  0.865 ***  0.864 ***  0.884 ***  0.884 ***  
    (5.879)  (5.833)  (5.812)  (5.579)  (5.548)  
HML     -0.010  -0.018  0.168  0.164  
      (-0.076)  (-0.128)  (0.752)  (0.695)  
WML       -0.012    -0.004  
        (-0.137)    (-0.044)  
RMW         0.302  0.303  
          (0.982)  (0.979)  
CMA         -0.158  -0.155  
          (-0.594)  (-0.550)  
Adj. R^2 0.462  0.554  0.551  0.548  0.550  0.547  
F-stat 140.463 ***  102.059 ***  67.621 ***  50.410 ***  40.863 ***  33.838 ***  
Table 14. Calendar-time regressions of rolling 36 month portfolio holding all IPOs. 
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market in the long-run as opposed to the event-time analysis that showed IPOs 
being a good investment for long-run if initial returns are considered with the 36 
month holding period return. In the 36 month period, the previously 
documented size effect among IPOs (see e.g. Ritter 1991; Loughran & Ritter 1995; 
Brav et al. 2000; Hahl et al. 2014) is captured by the models. The SMB factor 
loadings are positive, tilted towards small stocks and highly significant, meaning 
that in a 36 month period, the returns are driven by the small size of the issuing 
firms.  
 
Hahl et al. (2014) find quite similar results in their factor analysis of 36 month 
performance. The alphas of their regression models are negative, but marginally 
significant only in the 4-factor model, suggesting that their sample of IPO 
companies fare indifferently from the benchmark index, excluding the 4-factor 
model. Also, the SMB factor loadings are significant and positive, signifying that 
the returns of portfolio holding all IPOs for a 36 month rolling period are driven 
by small firms. The magnitude of SMB factor loadings in this study are 
unsurprisingly higher for all IPOs as opposed to Hahl et al. (2014) more middle 
ground results due to the inclusion of the First North marketplaces.  
 
 
36 MONTH 
PORTFOLIO  CAPM   2-factor    3-factor   4-factor   5-factor  6-factor  
R&D Intensive 
IPOs                       
α -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.006  -0.005   
  (-0.661)  (-0.945)  (-0.961)  (-0.858)  (-1.479)  (-1.351)   
Rm – Rf 0.810 ***  0.799 ***  0.812 ***  0.807 ***  0.850 ***  0.849 ***  
  (10.681)  (11.197)  (10.720)  (10.341)  (9.230)  (9.193)   
SMB   0.917 ***  0.908 ***  0.907 ***  1.003 ***  1.012 ***  
    (4.690)  (4.620)  (4.601)  (4.780)  (4.797)   
HML     -0.085  -0.105  0.059  0.005   
      (-0.501)  (-0.558)  (0.200)  (0.014)   
WML       -0.028    -0.065   
        (-0.248)    (-0.538)   
RMW         0.441  0.457   
          (1.081)  (1.116)   
CMA         0.222  0.283   
          (0.628)  (0.761)   
Adj. R^2 0.413  0.483  0.480  0.477  0.480  0.472   
F-stat 114.074 ***  75.426 ***  50.134 ***  37.395 ***  30.494 ***  25.346 ***  
Table 15. Calendar-time regressions of rolling 36 month portfolio holding R&D intensive IPOs. 
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In table 15, the factor regressions for R&D intensive IPOs show a similar pattern 
as the event-time analysis, which documents a mean WR of 1.05 and a median 
value of 0.96, although both of them statistically insignificant. The regression 
results propose that R&D intensive IPOs fare no better or worse than the market, 
although the 5 and 6 factor models show increasingly negative alphas, which 
could turn as significant negative abnormal returns with better fitting models.  
 
Similarly to the portfolio holding all IPOs, the returns of R&D intense companies 
are driven by small stocks as the positive and significant factor loadings on SMB 
demonstrate. This is no surprise, as IPO stocks tend to be smaller in terms of size, 
when compared to seasoned stocks and R&D intensive companies incline to be 
smaller than companies intense towards capital investments. The HML loadings, 
although insignificant, propose that R&D intense companies have a growth tilt 
in the long-run period, which could explain the more negative alphas as Hahl et 
al. (2014) document that growth IPOs perform significantly worse in the long-
run than value IPOs and portfolio holding all of their sample issues. Expectedly 
the R&D intense companies have low asset growth in comparison to the portfolio 
holding all companies seen as negative factor CMA loadings in table 14 and 
positive factor loadings in table 15. 
 
  
36 MONTH 
PORTFOLIO  CAPM   2-factor    3-factor   4-factor   5-factor   6-factor   
R&D Unintensive 
IPOs                   
α 0.001  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.002  0.002   
  (0.331)  (0.137)  (0.135)  (0.269)  (0.417)  (0.400)   
Rm – Rf 0.609 ***  0.598 ***  0.599 ***  0.587 ***  0.493 ***  0.493 ***  
  (7.965)  (8.181)  (7.723)  (7.308)  (5.269)  (5.248)   
SMB   0.787 ***  0.787 ***  0.784 ***  0.675 ***  0.674 ***  
    (3.951)  (3.922)  (3.898)  (3.164)  (3.143)   
HML     -0.004  -0.052  0.124  0.130   
      (-0.026)  (-0.270)  (0.413)  (0.406)   
WML       -0.066    0.007   
        (-0.563)    (0.053)   
RMW         -0.093  -0.094   
          (-0.223)  (-0.225)   
CMA         -0.750 **  -0.756 **  
          (-2.103)  (-2.011)   
Adj. R^2 0.282  0.343  0.339  0.336  0.347  0.346   
F-stat 63.448 ***  42.501 ***  28.152 ***  21.099 ***  17.939 ***  14.852 ***   
Table 16. Calendar-time regressions of rolling 36 month portfolio holding R&D unintensive IPOs. 
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In table 16, the calendar-time analysis of portfolio holding each R&D unintensive 
IPO for a rolling 36 month period produces no significant results in favor of the 
IPOs outperforming the market, disrespecting the results obtained in the event-
time analysis. Analysis with the event-time market adjustments produced results 
that promoted the superior nature of R&D unintensive IPOs as investments over 
the 36 month period, whereas the calendar-time risk-adjustments show positive 
but insignificant alphas for each of the 6 regressions. 
 
Similarly to previous calendar-time portfolio regressions, the 36 month portfolio 
of R&D unintensive companies is affected by the small size of the issuers with 
positive and significant SMB factor loadings. As opposed to previously 
investigated portfolios, the investment factor loadings on 5 and 6-factor models 
have negative and significant values, implying that the 36 month rolling R&D 
unintensive portfolio is exposed to firms with aggressive asset growth. An 
interesting result that signifies that firms with no or low investments towards 
intangible capital operate in more capital intensive industries and therefore 
require capital expenditures, whereas the R&D intensive firms are less savvy 
towards growing assets base and have positive and insignificant CMA factor 
loadings in the 36 month period. Also, although not significant result, the R&D 
unintensive firms have weak operating profitability compared to R&D intensive 
firms as the negative RMW coefficient in table 16 implies.  
 
The factor loadings’ nature changes somewhat over the examined time periods. 
The SMB loadings tilt towards higher positive values for each group in the longer 
period and HML loadings lean towards lower values with growth tilt in the 
longer examination period for each group. Similarly, the RMW loadings show a 
trend as the figures decrease in the longer examination periods, suggesting 
weakening operating profitability for IPO companies, which could imply 
motives of market timing. According to Pagano et al. (1998), companies use IPO 
proceeds to lower leverage after times of heavy investments, which can be seen 
as the negative and high magnitude CMA loadings for R&D intensive companies 
in the 6 month period and positive figures for the 36 month period. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This thesis has examined the initial underpricing, short and long-run 
performances of Danish, Finnish and Swedish initial public offerings over an 
eleven year period from 2005 to 2015. Moreover, the IPOs included in the sample 
are divided in two portfolios by assigning companies with expenses towards 
research and development in one and firms with no R&D expenditures prior to 
an exchange introduction to a second portfolio. The study is motivated by 
previous documentation on research and development investments positive 
relationship with stock returns, short and long-run anomalies shadowing IPOs 
and the sample countries overall high ranks as one of the most R&D intense 
nations in the world.  
 
The sample examined consists of 136 successful IPOs commenced during the 
examination period and covers only the purest initial public offerings in the 
Nordic Main and First North Markets with no previous trading history. Financial 
firms, list switching companies, OTC notes, reverse acquisitions, spinoffs and 
carve-outs are excluded from the initial sample of all occurred IPOs in the First 
North and Main Market exchanges of the sample countries. The performance is 
measured in event-time using market returns to benchmark each IPO return in 
every measuring period and risk-adjusted returns in calendar-time setting to take 
into consideration the varying risk levels of initial public offerings.  
 
The analysis provides mixed results. All IPOs have significant initial abnormal 
returns of 7.32 percent when outliers are included. With the outliers removed, 
the initial abnormally returns of sample companies reduces to 5.15 percent and 
remains statistically significant. The R&D unintensive firms witness higher 
underpricing than the R&D intensive businesses with a marginally significant 
mean difference of 6.22 percentage points. The similar pattern continues between 
the R&D intensive and unintensive companies throughout the event-time 
analysis as the R&D intensive firms lose systematically to the unintensive 
businesses in almost every measuring period for both short and long-run. 
Including the initial returns also has a significant effect to the results and 
promotes the superior performance of the R&D unintensive companies over the 
benchmark indices and R&D intensive firms in each of the event-time 
measurement period.  
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Using median returns provides fairly different results. Each of the subgroups 
witness statistically significant underperformance for the 1 month measurement 
period, when examined with medians and the poor performance continues with 
the R&D intensive companies in most of the measurement periods, albeit with 
insignificant test values. The inclusion of initial returns to the median results has 
a similar effect as with the mean returns and the underperformance of each group 
becomes indifferent from the market, and in long-run even turns into superior 
performance for all IPOs and R&D unintensive IPOs.  
 
An interesting pattern is documented at the one year mark as each of the 
subgroups witness WRs of over 1.00 promoting the superior performance of IPOs 
over the benchmark indices. When initial returns are incorporated for the one 
year period, the mean and median performance turn significant at conventional 
levels for all IPOs and in mean terms for both subgroups. An important notion at 
the first anniversary is the median WR of R&D intensive companies surpassing 
that of the R&D unintensive firms for the only time in all of the analyzed periods.  
 
At the three year anniversary in exchanges, the R&D intensive IPOs face adverse 
performance compared to R&D unintensive companies. The result could stem 
from the high variation in the payoffs from R&D investments among the sample 
companies and ensuing negative skew in the cash flows for the R&D intense 
firms from investing to creating innovations, which does not reflect (positively) 
in the prices for the 36 month period. The three year examination period may not 
therefore correctly capture the benefits of R&D investments, which the previous 
literature documents. Having a longer sample period would most likely bear 
some correction to the results and the direction of longer run WRs for R&D 
intensive companies would be clearer in either positive way due to successful 
innovations or negative direction because of more frequent bankruptcies due to 
failed to monetize innovations. 
 
Controlling for systematic risk with the CAPM, size and value effects with Fama 
and French three-factor model (1993), momentum with the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model, investment and profitability anomalies with the Fama and French 
(2015) five-factor model and all of the previous with the Fama and French (2018) 
six-factor model provides results for and against the event-time analysis. In 
short-run 6 month calendar-time regressions, portfolios holding all IPOs and 
R&D intensive IPOs were exposed to value effect with significant and positive 
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factor loadings on HML. Alphas of the 6 month portfolio factor regressions are 
insignificant from zero in all except for the R&D intensive portfolio with the 4 
and 6-factor models. The result is similar to the event-time analysis for the same 
short-run time period where R&D intensive firms lose to the benchmarks. The 
calendar-time analysis further shows that the momentum factor drives the R&D 
intensive portfolio’s returns, whereas the R&D unintensive portfolio’s risk 
characteristics are not captured well by the models.  
 
Previous literature documented small size exposure of new issues is recognized 
for each of the 36 month portfolios in which the returns are significantly driven 
by small firms. The R&D intensive companies are unexpectedly more inclined 
towards the SMB factor than R&D unintensive businesses and portfolio holding 
all IPOs. Also, the R&D unintensive companies have exposure towards 
investment factor as those companies with no investments towards intangible 
capital, such as research and development, are more inclined to operate in capital 
intensive fields and therefore need to invest more in capitalized physical assets. 
 
Even though the results did not reflect the initial assumptions on R&D companies 
performing better than the unintensive firms, the research topic remains as a 
subject of interest. Due to the Nordic nations’ technology-oriented character and 
high level of investments towards research and development, compared to the 
average figures of the rest of the world, it would be interesting to conduct a larger 
research to see whether R&D intense nations’ IPOs return characteristics on 
aggregate differ significantly from those of R&D unintensive countries. At the 
moment, the existing literature on R&D and aftermarket performance of IPOs is 
scarce and is not studied by appointing interest in examining the possible 
differences in return characteristics of research and development intense and 
unintense nations’ IPOs. The research could offer valuable contributions to 
utilize on the verge of initial public offerings as well as asset diversification 
benefits for institutions if the return characteristics of new issues show 
differences across R&D intense and unintense nations.  
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